2014-07-04

The Written Confessions By Fujita Shigeru

 
Windwing - The Japanese War Criminals * Fujita Shigeru
Fujita Shigeru
 
Abstract of the Written Confessions in English
 

Fujita Shigeru( 藤田茂 )

     According to the written confession of Fujita Shigeru in August 1954, he was born in 1889 in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan and went to Shanxi, China in August 1938 to join the Japanese War of Aggression against China, serving as colonel and commander of the 28th Cavalry Regiment. He took the position of lieutenant general and commander of the 59th Division of the 43rd Army in March 1945. He was captured in Hamhung, the Korean Peninsula in August 1945.

  Major offences:

     August 1938: arrested 6 local inhabitants in Hejin, Shanxi, "interrogated these arrested people through torture and beating, and killed them";

  November 1938: "searched for and killed most of the inhabitants of Sanluli Village" in Sanluli Village, 40 kilometers to the northeast of Yuncheng, Shanxi;

  Mid-January 1939: in Zhangliang Village, Anyi County, Shanxi, "told all officers, 'Killing people is a quick way to get soldiers accustomed to the battlefield, as it can test their courage. For this purpose, it is better to use the captives.' 'Bayoneting is more effective than shooting.'" In April, in Xiaxian County, "I ordered the commander of the First Squadron…to order 9 soldiers under his command to bayonet to death 9 captives." On 15 August, in Zezhou, Shanxi, "I ordered the First Squadron and the Second Squadron to take 8 and 9 captives respectively as teaching materials and bayonet those captives to death";

  From March 1944 to April 1945: "used 74 gas shells (green colored shells)" while serving as commander of the 4th Cavalry Brigade;

  10 April 1944: "I called all regiment commanders together at the Brigade Headquarters in Guide and ordered that" "regiment commanders could authorize the use of gas shells. During the battles, 20 gas shells are equipped for each cannon of the cavalry and 10 gas shells for each cannon of the regiment", and "try to kill captives on the battlefield as far as possible and calculate them into 'combat achievements'";

  2 May 1944: "bayoneted 4 captives" in Huangqiwei Village, 10 kilometers southwest to Xuchang, Henan;

  21 May 1944: "shot dead 12 Chinese people (including 1 woman)" in Luoyang, Henan;

  27 March 1945: "massacred all inhabitants of about 50 households in a village along the Dengxian County-Laohekou road, which is 200 meters to the north of Zhulinqiao, killing seniors, women, children… and other inhabitants"; "used gas shells during the attack in Maqushan" on the same day;

  9 May 1945: "killed many Chinese people" in Shiqiao, 25  kilometers northwest to Yishui, Shandong, and "burned down the entire Shiqiao Village"; in the same month, "ordered the Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Squad to use cholera virus to fight a germ war during the battles"; "gas shells and gas canisters were used" when attacking the Eighth Route Army in Haoshan; "to prevent soldiers from stepping on land mines placed by the Eighth Route Army, more than ten Chinese people were ordered to lead the way, i.e. to walk in the mine field in front of the troops";

  June 1945: "maltreated and killed captives in Jinan", and "over 600 captives of the Jinan Internment Camp who had been forced to build battle positions were bayoneted to death in soldier training after 15 June";

  "Arrangements after announcement of armistice: I called all squad commanders together on 17 August (1945) and ordered them to do the following: first, to destroy all kinds of documents (to get rid of criminal records of the Japanese imperialism, especially the evidence of cracking down on the Communist Party of China); second, to bury special bombs (gas shells, incendiary ammunition, smoke projectiles, light tracers and some fuse tubes); third, to destroy gas masks … …"

 

The Original Text Of The Written Confessions

Translation Of The Written Confessions (Chinese)

 

2014-07-03

The Written Confessions By Suzuki Keiku

 
Windwing - Japanese War Criminals * Suzuki Keiku
Suzuki Keiku
 
Abstract Of The Written Confessions In English
 

Suzuki Keiku(铃木启久)

  According to the written confession of Suzuki Keikuin July 1954, he was born in Fukushima Prefecture, Japan in 1890 and went to northeast China in 1934 to join the Japanese War of Aggression against China, serving as assistant commander of the 28th Infantry Regiment. In April 1945, he became lieutenant general and commander of the 117th Division. He was captured in Jilin on 31August 1945.

  Major offences:

  Around June 1934: "killed two Chinese peasants" in Jinzhou;

  Around early March 1935: assisted Colonel Takagi in "burning down two villages with a total of 300 households near Shangban City and killing many Chinese people";

  September 1940: "used poison gas to brutally kill all" of the 50 or so anti-Japanese soldiers hidden indoor in a battle in Xuancheng, Anhui;

  1941: set up a comfort station in Chaoxian County, Anhui and abducted 20 "Chinese and Korean women as comfort women";

  November 1941: in an attack on the Eighth Route Army in Zaoqiang, Hebei, "killed 10 soldiers, burned down two villages with around 600 households, and also slaughtered 100 Chinese peasants";

  December 1941: "forced inhabitants" "in the area within 2 kilometers of the Great Wall" "to relocate and made the area a depopulated zone";

  January 1942: ordered Colonel Taisuke to "burn down the houses of about 800 households and slaughter 1,000 Chinese peasants in a mop-up operation" in Tangshan area;

  April 1942: in Tianguanying, Fengrun, Hebei, "brutally killed soldiers of the Eighth Route Army and used poison gas in an attack to murder about 100 cadres and soldiers of the Eighth Route Army in the caves in Lujiayu" and "cruelly killed 235 Chinese peasants seeking refuge in a village near Lujiayu (cutting open the bellies of pregnant women among them), burned down houses of about 800 households, killed 5captives to be delivered to Yutian, and raped as many as100 women";

  July 1942: in Fengrun, "burned down civilian houses of around 500 households and brutally killed about 100 Chinese peasants";

  From September to December 1942: in order to "create depopulated zones, i.e. to force all the residents to move out" of regions including Qian'an and Zunhua, "burned down the houses of over 10,000 households in those regions, forced tens of thousands of people to relocate and also massacred many people";

  October 1942: "murdered 1,280 peasants in Daizhuang Village, Panjia, Luanxian County in such cruel ways like shooting, bayoneting, slashing and burying alive, and burned down the houses of all 800 households in the village";

  1942: ordered "to set up comfort stations in all" regions where Japanese troops were stationed and "to lure about 60 Chinese women to serve as comfort women";

  May 1944: in Xinxiang, Henan, "attacked anti-Japanese guerrilla forces and killed around 10 of their soldiers, burned down about 300 houses in villages close to the battlefield, and killed about 100 Chinese peasants";

  July 1944: in Fengqiu, Henan, "killed about 40 soldiers of the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces, burned down a neighboring village of about 400 households, and killed about 100 Chinese peasants";

  August 1944: "attacked and killed about 10 soldiers" of the anti-Japanese troops in Huaiqing, Henan, "burned down farmhouses of about 400 households, and brutally killed some 30 Chinese people";

  November 1944: "I ordered the infantry to invade the southern part of Linxian County, and, when the troops were pulling out of the region, I ordered the Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Squad to spread cholera virus in three or four villages. Afterwards, I received a report saying that 'more than 100 Chinese people in Linxian were infected with cholera, and the death toll was also high'"; after this, in a village in Changlu County, "burned down the houses of around 300 households and killed 660 Chinese peasants of the village in extremely brutal ways like shooting, bayoneting and burning"; "Also during this attack, 30 captives were killed by soldiers under my command.";

  "In order to test the method of killing people with air injection, I ordered in spring 1945 the division field hospital in Huaiqing to "conduct an experiment, which is to test it on a hospitalized Chinese soldier of the Puppet County Guards with an extremely high price";

  Spring 1945: "killed about 500 peasants and burned down the houses of all the 600 households" in a village in Huaiqing;

  Around spring 1945: "burned down the houses of around 400 households in villages" near Jiaozuo, and "brutally killed some 100 Chinese peasants";

  1945: "ordered to set up comfort stations in the regions occupied by the Japanese troops, and lured about 60 Chinese and Korean women to serve as comfort women";

  Mid-July 1945: "invaded Liquan, and slaughtered about 40 Chinese people";

  "During the aggression against China", and "based on my memory alone, 5,470 Chinese people were killed, and the houses of 18,229 Chinese households were burned down or damaged. The actual number (may) be much higher."

 

The Original Text Of The Written Confessions

Translation Of The Written Confessions (Chinese)

 

 

The Written Confessions Of The Japanese War Criminals

Windwing - The Written Confessions Of The Japanese War Criminals
July 3, One Of Japan's Asahi Shimbun Reporters At A News Conference Before Filming The Content On The Panel.
 
China Publicizes Confessions By Japanese War Criminals
 
Confessions made by 45 Japanese war criminals tried and convicted by military tribunals in China after World War II (WWII) will be published online from Thursday.
Handwritten confessions, along with Chinese translations and abstracts in both Chinese and English, will be published on the website of the State Archives Administration.
The administration will publish the confessions by one each day over a 45-day period.
These archives are hard evidence of the heinous crimes committed by Japanese imperialism against the Chinese.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, disregarding historical justice and human conscience, has been openly talking black into white, misleading the public, and beautifying Japanese aggression and its colonial history since he took office.
This challenges WWII achievements and the post-WWII international order.
The July 7 incident, or the Lugouqiao Incident, in 1937 marked the beginning of China's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, which lasted eight years.
A 38-page confession by Suzuki Keiku, who served as assistant commander of the 28th Infantry Regiment and later as lieutenant general and commander of the 117th Division in the Japanese army, was the first to be published.
He ordered Colonel Taisuke to "burn down the houses of about 800 households and slaughter 1,000 Chinese peasants in a mop-up operation" in the Tangshan area in January 1942. He "murdered 1,280 peasants in Daizhuang Village, Panjia, Luanxian County by shooting, bayoneting, slashing and burying them alive, and burned down the houses of all 800 households in the village" in October 1942. He also "ordered to set up comfort stations in regions occupied by Japanese troops, and lured about 60 Chinese and Korean women to serve as comfort women" in 1945.
Which were signed by the war criminals, are scans of the originals.
There were 1,109 Japanese war criminals in custody in China between 1950 and 1956.
Among them, 1,017 with minor offenses were exempted from prosecution and released in 1956 and 45 received open trials in special military tribunals under the Supreme People's Court that year.
The 45 were charged with planning and implementing an aggression policy, making germ weapons, releasing poisonous gas, conducting experiments on living human beings, killing, stealing property, forcible recruitment of "comfort women", raping and driving out locals from their homes.
The 45 war criminals were sentenced to imprisonment from eight to 20 years.
The administration is sorting out archives of confessions made by the 1,017 with minor offenses and will make them public in the future.
 
************************************************************************

Introduction

  On August 14 1945, Emperor Hirohito of Japan issued an imperial edict on armistice, announcing Japan's unconditional surrender. In accordance with the Potsdam Proclamation, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was formed by 11 countries, including China, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and had trials on Hideki Tojo and other Japanese war criminals responsible for launching the Japanese War of Aggression against China and the Pacific War.

  After the birth of New China, a total of 1,109 Japanese war criminals were taken over and held in custody in the two places of Fushun and Taiyuan. In 1954, the Supreme People's Procuratorate Office of the Central People's Government (later renamed the Supreme People's Procuratorate of the People's Republic of China) was responsible for the investigation and prosecution of the Japanese war criminals. It had trials on their crimes committed during the Japanese War of Aggression against China, including violating China's sovereignty, planning and implementing the policy of aggression, conducting spy and espionage activities, manufacturing bacteria weapons, releasing poison gas, killing, arresting, enslaving and poisoning the Chinese people, raping women, plundering money and materials, destroying towns and villages, expelling peaceful inhabitants, and violating international norms and humanitarian principles.

  According to the Decision on the Handling of the Criminals in Custody from the Japanese War of Aggression against China adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) on 25 April 1956, the Supreme People's Procuratorate of the People's Republic of China announced the decision to exempt from prosecution and immediately release, in three batches in 1956, a total of 1,017 Japanese war criminals in custody, who had relatively minor offenses and good behaviors of repentance. Meanwhile, a public prosecution was initiated to the Special Military Tribunal of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China on 45 Japanese war criminals, who were of higher positions and heavier offenses (the other 47 war criminals died in custody).

  From June to July 1956, the Special Military Tribunal of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China publicly tried in Shenyang and Taiyuan the 45 war criminals including Suzuki Keiku, and, based on the defendants' criminal facts, circumstances of the crimes, repentance, etc., treated them with leniency in accordance with the decision of the NPC Standing Committee, sentencing them to from twenty years to eight years in prison respectively.

  Archives related to the trials of the war criminals of the Japanese War of Aggression against China, such as documents issued by the NPC Standing Committee, the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Special Military Tribunal of the Supreme People's Court, are stored in the Central Archives. The confessions written by all the war criminals and the detailed trial records contained in the archive files are irrefutable evidence of the heinous crimes committed by the Japanese militarist aggressors against the Chinese people.

  Since the Abe cabinet came into power in Japan, it has openly confused right and wrong to mislead the public, in an attempt to whitewash the history of external aggression and colonialism. This is a total disregard of the historical justice and human conscience, as well as a challenge to the outcome of World War II and the post-war international order. On the occasion of the 77th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we at the Central Archives have selected from the archive files the written confessions of the 45 Japanese war criminals tried by the Supreme People's Court, including the original texts of the written confessions, supplements, corrections, postscripts, etc. as well as the then Chinese translations with abstracts, to release to the general public, in order to expose the anti-humanitarianism, anti-humanity, and anti-civilization atrocities during the Japanese invasion of China.

  The past, if not forgotten, can serve as a guide for the future. Only by truly remembering the history and learning from the history, can we avoid a repeat of the tragedy of war and achieve real and lasting peace and stability in the world.

2014-06-25

The NYTimes' 'China Threat' Myth, The 'Pivot To Asia,' And Obama's Foreign Policy Legacy

The NYTimes' 'China Threat' Myth, The 'Pivot To Asia,' And Obama's Foreign Policy Legacy

Stephen Harner, Contributor

We should expect The New York Times , as a loyal retainer of President Obama, now focused on embellishing his administration's record of accomplishments, to be anxious when it comes to foreign policy. What seemed the task at the end of the first term was to laud Hillary Clinton's non-stop peregrinations and to claim (prematurely) that the President had placed the United States on the "right side of history" in the Middle East.

Now, with the Middle East in turmoil, and Obama's first term now widely acknowledged to have been (with the exception of the exit from Iraq) singularly devoid of significant foreign policy achievements, it has become The Times' task to ensure that one Obama initiative retains enough apparent legitimacy to inform his legacy.

That initiative is Obama's strategic military "pivot" or "rebalance" to Asia, the decision to redeploy 60% of American air and sea power  to Asia by 2020.  Why?  To counter to an aggressive, hegemonic, expansionist China.  Never mind that the narrative of an expansionist China is a myth.

Windwing - The South China Sea, And 9-Dotted Line English: Map of the South China Sea, with 9-dotted line highlighted in green (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

We see The Times propounding–and building–the China-as-aggressor myth again in a June 18 editorial entitled "China's Power Grab is Alarming."  The editorial speaks of "worries in Washington and elsewhere about Beijing's continued bullying in energy-rich [South China Sea] waters…."

The editorial cites "Beijing's efforts to assert sovereignty over the many specks of rock dotting the South China Sea," including now "the piling of sand on isolated reefs and shoals to create what amounts to new islands in the Spratly archipelago,"  and "a strongly worded statement last month by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel condemning China's 'destabilizing, unilateral actions in the South China Sea.'"

The Times continues: "China insists that the Spratlys, Paracels and other islands have always belonged to China. But Vietnam also claims sovereignty, and parts of them are claimed by the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei."

So, may we now conclude that The Times' case for China as aggressor–and by extension the 'pivot' as a necessary and proper strategic response–is made?  To do so would be swallowing the myth. The reality is almost completely the opposite.

China claims sovereignty over the Spratlys and Paracels islands in the South China Sea.  By China, we should understand not just the People's Republic in Beijing, but its post-1911 predecessor, the Republic of China (i.e., the government on Taiwan), and the great China's imperial dynasties dating back at least 1000 years.  The claim is based inter alia on discoveries by the Ming dynasty admiral Zheng He and by occupation of islands and exploitation of the surrounding waters for fishing by Chinese fishermen for hundreds of years.

The famous "nine-dash line" is an expression of China's historical claims.  It was first transposed on Chinese maps in 1947 when France (then still the suzerain of Vietnam) and the Philippines began a diplomatic campaign to assert their claims in post-WWII forums dealing with Japan's imperial conquests (which included the islands).

Five times–in 1970, 1971, 1978, 1980, and 1999–Philippine armed forces took actions that have placed nine islands claimed by China under foreign occupation.  Since occupying the islands, the Philippines has proceeded to build military installations and station some 1000 men on them.

Beyond occupying the islands, Manila has for years taken actions highly provocative to China, including arresting and expelling Chinese fisherman fishing in the disputed area. Chinese protests have been dismissed. In June 2011 the office of PI president Aquino declared that the South China Sea would henceforth be called the West Philippine Sea. In July 2011 a delegation of Philippine legislators landed on a Chinese-claimed island, declaring Philippine "sovereignty."

Against this background, what we–and The Times–should find remarkable is not China's "maximalist stance in territorial disputes," to quote the editorial, but Beijing's restraint.

On the recent altercation with Vietnam over Chinese drilling operations, on May 15, three days after Secretary of State John Kerry called the operations "provocative" and an "aggressive act," People's Liberation Army Chief of the General Staff General Fang Fenghui, on a reciprocal visiting to the Pentagon, said the following.  Quoting DoD's transcript of the press conference:

"China is conducting the exploitation activity within 12 nautical miles of the Zhongjian Islands which is a part of the Paracel Islands. And this is an activity conducted within our territorial water.

"And secondly, the related countries in the South–in the South China Sea have drilled actually many oil wells in the South China Sea, but China has never drilled even one.  From this single fact, we can see how much restraint China has exercised.  And the purpose of this restraint is to keep–to maintain the stability of the South China Sea region.

"We have an enduring position of putting aside disputes and achieve [sic] common exploitation.  But while China is holding this position, other nations are drilling oil wells in this region.  So that's–this is the status quo.  And I have to underscore it is only under this background that we are conducting the exploitation activity within the Zhongjian island."

What to make of the facts and context above, and the absence in The Times' editorial of any mention of them?

The Times remains a reliable organ of the American "internationalist" establishment–the Pentagon, defense industry, national security and intelligence bureaucracies and "think tanks." For this establishment, American "leadership"–in reality hegemony backed by unchallengeable military power, deployed the world over–is and must remain the sine qua non of a stable international order, particularly in Asia.

The Obama White House has been a servant of this establishment, and Obama's militarized 'pivot to Asia" policy is the Establishment's top priority initiative.

The supreme irony is that the 'pivot' policy–in essence an American reprise of Cold War "containment"now directed at China, fueling an arms race and U.S. alliance structure that is a growing threat to China–has emboldened the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as Japan, to oppose and challenge China, and to decline to negotiate in good faith to resolve disputes.

Doing its duty for the Establishment, and for Obama's legacy, The New York Times is propagating a "China threat" myth and is biased, unfair, untrue, and, in the end, dangerous for the United States.

 

2014-05-22

Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Evolution Of Chinese Clothing And CheongSam/QiPao

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
Chinese clothing has approximately 5,000 years of history behind it, but regrettably I am only able to cover 2,500 years in this fashion timeline.
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

I began with the Han dynasty as the term hanfu (meaning: dress of ethnic Chinese people) was coined in that period.

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
Please bear in mind that this is only a generalized timeline of Chinese clothing primarily featuring aristocratic and upper-class ethnic Han Chinese women (the exceptions are Fig. 8 (dancer) and Fig. 11 (maid, due to the fact I couldn’t find many paintings in the Yuan period)).
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Image Source: lilsuika

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
Main resources: 5,000 years of Chinese Costume , China Chic: East Meets West , and Changing Clothes in China: Fashion, History, Nation  and Hong Kong Museum of History . 5,000 years of Chinese Costume is an invaluable resource (though sadly currently out of print), I would highly recommend this book if you can get your hands on it.
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
Han Dynasty:
“In the Han Dynasty, as of old, the one-piece garment remained the formal dress for women. However, it was somewhat different from that of the Warring States Period, in that it had an increased number of curves in the front and broadened lower hems. Close-fitting at the waist, it was always tied with a silk girdle.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 32)
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Wei and Jin dynasties: 
“On the whole, the costumes of the Wei and Jin period still followed the patterns of Qin and Han.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 54)
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
“From the costumes worn by the benefactors in the Dunhuang murals and the costumes of the pottery figurines unearthed in Louyang, it can be seen that women’s costumes in the period of Wei and Jin were generally large and loose. The upper garment opened at the front and was tied at the waist. The sleeves were broad and fringed at the cuffs with decorative borders of a different colour. The skirt had spaced coloured stripes and was tied with a white silk band at the waist. There was also an apron between the upper garment and skirt for the purpose of fastening the waist. Apart from wearing a multi-coloured skirt, women also wore other kinds such as the crimson gauze-covered skirt, the red-blue striped gauze double skirt, and the barrel-shaped red gauze skirt. Many of these styles are mentioned in historical records.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 65)
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Southern and Northern Dynasties:

“During the Wei, Jin and the Southern and Northern Dynasties, though men no longer wore the traditional one-piece garment, some women continued to do so. However, the style was quite different from that seen in the Han Dynasty. Typically the women’s dress was decorated with xian and shao. The latter refers to pieces of silk cloth sewn onto the lower hem of the dress, which were wide at the top and narrow at the bottom, so that triangles were formed overlapping each other. Xian refers to some relatively long ribbons which extended from the short-cut skirt. While the wearer was walking, these lengthy ribbons made the sharp corners n the lower hem wave like a flying swallow, hence the Chinese phrase ‘beautiful ribbons and flying swallowtail’.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 62)

“During the Southern and Northern Dynasties, costumes underwent further changes in style. The long flying ribbons were no longer seen and the swallowtailed corners became enlarged. As a result the flying ribbons and swallowtailed corners were combined into one.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 62)
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
Sui Dynasty:
“During the period of the Sui and early Tang, a short jacket with tight sleeves was worn in conjunction with a tight long skirt whose waist was fastened almost to the armpits with a silk ribbon. In the ensuing century, the style of this costume remained basically the same, except for some minor changes such as letting out the jacket and/or its sleeves.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 88)

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Tang Dynasty:
“The Tang Dynasty was the most prosperous period in China’s feudal society. Changan (now Xian, Shananxi Province), the capital, was the political, economic and cultural centre of the nation. […] Residents in Changan included people of such nationalities as Huihe (Uygur,) Tubo (Tibetan), and Nanzhao (Yi), and even Japanese, Xinluo (Korean), Persian and Arabian. Meanwhile, people frequently traveled to and fro between countries like Vietnam, India and the East Roman Empire and Changan, thus spreading Chinese culture to other parts of the world.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 76)

“…all the national minorities and foreign envoys who thronged the streets of Changan also contributed something of their own culture to the Tang. Consequently, paintings, carvings, music and dances of the Tang absorbed something of foreign skills and styles. The Tang government adopted the policy of taking in every exotic form whether or hats or clothing, so that Tang costumes became increasingly picturesque and beautiful.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 88)

“Women of the Tang Dynasty paid particular attention to facial appearance, and the application of powder or even rouge was common practice. Some women’s foreheads were painted dark yellow and the dai (a kind of dark blue pigment) was used to paint their eyebrows into different shapes that were called dai mei (painted eyebrows) in general.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 89)

“In the years of Tianbao during Emperor Xuanzong’s reign, women used to wear men’s costumes. This was not only a fashion among commoners, but also for a time it spread to the imperial court and became customary for women of high birth.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 89)
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
Song Dynasty:
“The hairstyle of the women of the Song Dynasty still followed the fashion of the later period of the Tang Dynasty, the high bun being the favoured style. Women’s buns were often more than a foot in height.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 107)

“Women’s upper garments consisted mainly of coat, blouse, loose-sleeved dress, over-dress, short-sleeved jacket and vest. The lower garment was mostly a skirt.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 107)

“Women in the Song Dynasty seldom wore boots, since binding the feet had become fashionable.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 107)

“Although historians do not know exactly how or why foot binding began, it was apparently initially associated with dancers at the imperial court and professional female entertainers in the capital. During the Song dynasty (960-1279) the practice spread from the palace and entertainment quarters into the homes of the elite. ‘By the thirteenth century, archeological evidence shows clearly that foot-binding was practiced among the daughters and wives of officials,’ reports Patricia Buckley Ebrey […] Over the course of the next few centuries foot binding became increasingly common among gentry families, and the practice eventually penetrated the mass of the Chinese people.” (Chinese Chic: East Meets West, pg. 37-38)
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
Yuan Dynasty:
“Han women continued to wear the jacket and skirt. However, the choice of darker shades and buttoning on the left showed Mongolian influence.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 131)

“After the Mongols settled down in the Central Plains, Mongolian customs and costumes also had their influence on those of the Han people. While remaining the main costume for Han women, the jacket and skirt had deviated greatly in style from those of the Tang and Song periods. Tight-fitting garments gave way to big, loose ones; and collar, sleeves and skirt became straight. In addition, lighter more serene colours gained preference.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 142)
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
Ming Dynasty:
“The clothing for women in the Ming Dynasty consisted mainly of gowns, coats, rosy capes, over-dresses with or without sleeves, and skirts. These styles were imitations of ones first seen in the Tang and Song Dynasties. However, the openings were on the right-hand side, according to the Han Dynasty convention.” ((5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 147)
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
Qing Dynasty
When China fell under Manchurian rule, Chinese men were forced to adopt Manchurian customs. As a sign of submission, the new government made a decree that men must shave their head and wear the Manchurian queue or lose their heads. Many choose the latter.

On the other hand, Chinese women were not pressured to adopt Manchurian clothing and fashions. “Women, in general, wore skirts as their lower garments, and red skirts were for women of position. At first, there were still the “phoenix-tail” skirt and the “moonlight” skirt and others from the Ming tradition. However the styles evolved with the passage of time: some skirts were adorned with ribbons that floated in the air when one walked; some had little bells fastened under them: others had their lower edge embroidered with wavy designs. As the dynasty drew to an end, the wearing of trousers became the fashion among commoner women. There were trousers with full crotches and over trousers, both made of silk embroidered with patters.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 173)
 
The Manchurians attempted several times to eradicate the practice of foot-binding, but were largely unsuccessful. Manchurian women admired the gait of bound women but were effectively banned from practicing food-binding. Hence, a “flower pot shoe” later came into creation and it allowed its wearer the same unsteady gait but without any need for foot-binding. Photograph of flowerpot shoe here: [link]

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
1911-1940s

“Ever since the Tang Dynasty, the design of Chinese women’s costumes had kept to the same straight style: flat and straight lines for the chest, shoulders and hips, with few curves visible; and it was not until the 1920’s that Chinese women came to appreciate ‘the beauty of curves’, and to pay attention to figure when cutting and making up dresses, instead of adhering to the traditional style.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 214)

“The most popular item of a Chinese woman’s wardrobe in modern times was the qi pao . Originally the dress of the Manchus, it was adopted by Han women in the 1920s. Modifications and improvements were then made so that for a time, it became the most fashionable form of dress for women in China.
Two main factors account for women’s general preference for the qi pao : first, it was economical and convenient to wear. [...] Second, it was more fitted and looked more flattering.” (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 214-215)

"The qi pao  underwent numerous changes in style after its first appearance, and by the 1930's it had entirely changed from its original form to become unique among women's costumes." (5,000 years of Chinese Costume, pg. 215)

Women traditionally bound their breasts in the Ming and Qing dynasties with tight fitting vests and continued to do so in the early 20th century. A ban on bound breasts began in 1927, in which the government started advocating for the “Natural Breast Movement”. Despite this, bound breasts still widely continued into the 1930s. The government also banned earrings as it fell under the criteria of deforming the natural body. The 1930s also saw the introduction of the western/French bra come to Shanghai.

“The little vest was designed to constrain the breasts and streamline the body. Such a garment was necessary to look comme il faut  around 1908, when (as J. Dyer Ball observed): ‘fashion decreed that jackets should fit tight, though not yielding to the contours of the figure, except in the slightest degree, as such an exposure of the body would be considered immodest.’ It became necessary again in the mid-twenties, when the jacket-blouse—a garment cut on rounded lines – began to give way to the qipao.  At this stage, darts were not used to tailor the bodice or upper part of the qipao , nor would they be till the mid-fifties. The most that could be done by way of further fitting the qipao  to the bosom was to stretch the material at the right places through ironing. Under these circumstances, breast-binding must have made the tailor’s task easier.” (Finnane 163, Changing Clothes in China: Fashion, History, Nation)

Successful eradication of bound feet would not come until the 1949 when the People’s Republic of China came into power.
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
1950s-1960’s
Under the People’s Republic of China, very few mainland women wore the cheongsam, save for ceremonial attire. In this era, clothing became de-sexualized for mainlanders.

It was the flip side in Hong Kong, as the cheongsam  (Cantonese, qipao  in Mandarin) continued its function as everyday wear which lasted until the late 1960s. The cheongsam  in the 1950s and 1960s became even tighter fitting to further accentuate feminine curves. Western clothing became the default after the late 1960s, though the cheongsam  continued to survive as uniforms for students (who donned a looser and more androgynous version), waitresses, brides, and beauty contestants.
Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
21st century
Designers today are creating new forms of the qipao / cheongsam . The fish tail appears to be a current popular trend.

More on Cheongsam/Qipao 2.0 here: [link]  

You can also see a more indepth timeline of the Cheongsam/Qipao here: [link]

Windwing - Fashion Timeline Of Chinese Women Clothing
The 2010 Cannes Film Festival, FanBingBing  ,  QiPao 3.0

2014-05-21

U.S. Indictment Of Chinese Hackers Could Be Awkward For The NSA


Windwing - U.S. Indictment Of Chinese Hackers Could Be Awkward For The NSA

Attorney General Eric Holder, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Carlin, second right, U.S. Attorney for Western District of Pennsylvania David Hickton, left, and FBI Executive Associate Director Robert Anderson, right, speak at a news conference at the Justice Department in Washington.Photo: Charles Dharapak/AP

It's no secret that the Chinese military represents a real threat to online security here in the U.S. Over the last several years, state-sponsored Chinese hackers have broken into hundreds of American targets–both inside the U.S. government and across the private sector. But when the Department of Justice announced criminal charges against five hackers working for China's military this morning, it came at an awkward time. After a year of revelations from ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden, it's clearer than ever before that America's own government hackers have been running rampant through the world's networks.

On Monday, the Justice Department indicted five hackers associated with China's People's Liberation Army, accusing them of stealing information from six American companies across the energy, metals, and manufacturing industries. The charges represent a new elevation of America's cyberspy-versus-cyberspy conflict with China, transforming a diplomatic situation into a criminal issue. But cybersecurity policy-watchers say that the arrival of the indictments in the wake of Snowden's serial revelations could both lessen the charges' impact and leave American officials open to parallel criminal allegations from Chinese authorities.

In other words, US intelligence officials should think twice before planning any summer vacations in the People's Republic. "It's an unprecedented move, and we'll have to see if other counties reciprocate with the same kind of actions," says Sean Lawson, a professor who focuses on public policy, cybersecurity and the military at the University of Utah. "This could potentially open U.S. officials to similar charges, not just in China but other countries as well. Brazil could turn around and say: 'If you start charging foreign officials for cyberespionage against companies, maybe we'll do the same to officials at the NSA.'"

Calling the Kettle Black

Last September, a story based on information from Snowden said that the NSA recently hacked into the Brazilian oil firm Petrobras. Just two months ago, another Snowden leak revealed the NSA had hacked Chinese networking company Huawei to steal source code. And those are just two of a slew of reports over the last year that the NSA and its allies have hacked foreign governments and occasionally private sector targets to gather intelligence. The attacks may have happened as many as 231 times in 2011 alone.

In fact, NSA's British counterpart GCHQ last week was hit by a legal complaint from Privacy International, which accused the UK agency of illegally using malware to spy on its targets, including British citizens.

"Hacking a computer is a crime," says Privacy International deputy director Eric King, who also teaches law at the London School of Economics.1 "There are real questions about whether these agencies' employees are independently criminally liable. If China wants to start prosecuting those who hack their infrastructure, NSA employees could be arrested on the exact same legal justifications as the Chinese who have been put on the FBI's most-wanted list."

Windwing - U.S. Indictment Of Chinese Hackers Could Be Awkward For The NSA

Press materials are displayed on a table of the Justice Department before Attorney General Eric Holder was to speak at a news conference. Photo: Charles Dharapak/AP

Ammunition for the Chinese

Chinese officials didn't miss the opportunity to make a similar jab. "For a long time, the U.S. has clearly conducted large-scale, organized theft, network monitoring and control activities against foreign dignitaries, corporations, and individuals," reads a statement in Chinese from the country's ministry of foreign affairs. "Once again, we strongly urge the U.S. to offer a clear explanation and immediately stop such activities."

The fact that the Chinese government has the ammunition to make that rebuttal shows how the NSA's spying has weakened America's position, and also makes the Justice Department criminal charges less likely to stop future attacks, says the University of Utah's Lawson. "They've muddied the water," he says. "This doesn't mean Chinese should get a pass, but it shows how the NSA has been doing real harm to American companies." Bruce Schneier, a cryptography expert who has reviewed some of Snowden's leaked documents for the Guardian, puts it more simply: "We've lost any moral high ground to complain about this stuff. That's bad."

To be fair, the five Chinese hackers named in Monday's indictment are accused specifically of stealing trade secrets to give Chinese companies an advantage in industry negotiations and competition. That's a kind of spying that US officials have repeatedly denied the NSA engages in. But it's not clear how much that point helps to legally or diplomatically distinguish Chinese hacking activities from cyberespionage by America and its allies. And Snowden has also alluded to forthcoming revelations that may show the NSA isn't above industrial espionage, either.

In the meantime, the FBI posters showing Chinese hackers' faces should also send a message to the staffers of American intelligence agencies carrying out similar intrusion operations, says Privacy International's King. "I'd be looking long and hard at what the justification for those actions are," he says. "And if they're found wanting, raise hell."

1Correction 6:14 EST 05/19/14: This story has been updated to properly identify Eric King.


2014-05-20

What Japan Cannot Learn From Germany

What Japan Cannot Learn From Germany

Windwing - What Japan Cannot Learn from Germany
Image Credit: REUTERS/Kim Hong-Ji

Reports on contemporary Japanese diplomacy usually mention and often focus on the large role that the history of World War II plays in Japan's relations with its Asian neighbors. Japan's murderous past keeps making headlines, often through comments from politicians, public officials, lobbying groups, or historians. U.S. President Barack Obama's statement, during his recent Korea visit, that Japan's use of South Korean comfort women during the war was an egregious violation of human rights is but one of many examples.
In trying to understand why Japan's past casts such a long shadow onto its present, one promising approach is to compare the country to its erstwhile World War II ally, Germany. That country's targeted campaign of genocide still plays an important role in shaping the country's national identity, but Germany's past still does not weigh as heavily on its relations with its neighbors as Japan's does. Through a difficult and arduous process of confronting, remembering, and on occasion apologizing for its Nazi past, Germany has come to terms with its history and reconciled with the victims of its past aggression. Faced with this evidence, it is tempting to conclude that the more strained, sometimes poisoned relations that Japan has with its Asian neighbors are a direct product of the way in which it dealt – or failed to deal – with its wartime history.
The most recent instance of this line of argument can be found in Jochen Bittner's New York Times op-ed, "What Germany Can Teach Japan" published last month. Bittner argues that postwar Germany has become "normal" – defined as "earning and enjoying the trust of its neighbors" – because it dealt properly with its history of genocidal mass murder. If Japan also wants to become normal, he recommends, it should simply follow the German example.
But it is not that simple. The fact that Germany has achieved "normalcy" cannot be reduced to the way it dealt and deals with its history. Factors beyond Germany's control, including fortunate circumstances and cooperative neighbors, played a far more important role and make Germany's recipe for normalcy impossible for Japan. A brief glance at Japan's postwar history reveals at least five factors which explain why, almost 70 years after the war, Germany is surrounded by friendly allies and Japan is not.
First, as unity among the Allies who had vanquished Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during World War Two after 1945 gave way to the competition between capitalist democracies and communist autocracies, West Germany was integrated into NATO, while Japan found cover under America's nuclear umbrella. German dependence on a multilateral treaty system, supported by three nuclear powers (United States, Great Britain and France) gave that country some room to negotiate, and on occasions exploit, differences between its three protectors. Differences between the U.S. and France were to become particularly important for Germany's future. Japan, on the other hand, has been locked since 1945 into a bilateral relationship with the U.S. where the latter enjoys (and shows little inclination to relinquish) monopoly power in matters of protection, leaving Japan relatively little negotiating room.
Second, while the ideological conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is commonly known as the Cold War, the term is appropriate only in the West. In Asia the conflict between the capitalist and communist camp was fought at a much higher temperature in a series of proxy wars: first in Korea, then in Vietnam (and secretly in Laos and Cambodia) and finally in Afghanistan. This did not create a climate that encouraged Japanese foreign policymakers to seek freedom from U.S. protection. The already close security relationship only grew closer.
Third, Germany borders France, a country that aspired after the war to return to the status of a "Grande Nation," independent of superpower influence. To do that, France needed a relationship to balance her dependence on U.S. protection. What better choice than Germany, the world's second largest economy before the war, soon to become Europe's economic powerhouse. Certainly, the West German government deserves credit for seizing the opportunity that France offered and for developing the Franco-German relationship over the years into what today is the European Union. But this would have been impossible without France's goodwill, initiative and cooperation. Faulting Japan for not having done something similar is short-sighted, for which country in the Far East is Asia's counterpart to France? Most Asian countries were still colonies in the early postwar period, thus unable to formulate an independent foreign policy and form alliances with Japan. In fact, the only nation of France's stature in Asia in the postwar period was the People's Republic of China. Does anyone seriously believe that Washington would have stood by idly watching if Japan had sought to establish a relationship with communist China similar to that between Germany and France in Europe?
Fourth, German Chancellor Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" – that is, his offer of reconciliation across the Iron Curtain, memorably symbolized by kneeling in front of the Ghetto Uprising Memorial in Warsaw in 1970 – became possible only after Germany had cemented its Atlantic relation with the U.S. and begun laying the foundation for the EU. Only because Germany enjoyed the military protection provided by NATO, access to European markets, and peace in Europe did German leaders feel able to try not only more democracy, but also a rapprochement with communist neighbors in Eastern Europe. Within the U.S.-sponsored security architecture put in place in Asia, Japan never enjoyed the degree freedom that Germany exercised under Brandt. Offending U.S. interests was and remains too risky for a country that depends on U.S. protection in military affairs and access to U.S. markets.
Finally, while the end of the Cold War was experienced as a turning point for many European countries, especially in Germany, there was no corresponding watershed moment in Asia. As the Soviet Union dissolved, its republics and satellites regained true sovereignty, and Germany was reunited. In spite of the tremendous economic growth experienced in Asia, the predominant perception there is one of political stasis. Korea remains divided. So does China. Authoritarian regimes are still in place. The year 1989 saw the fall of the Berlin wall at the center of Europe, and the Tiananmen Square massacre in Asia. So is it any wonder that Japan sought and seeks to align itself more closely to its protector, the U.S., while occasionally trying to negotiate some freedom within the existing structure? As John Mearsheimer has convincingly argued, Tokyo's recent hard line against Beijing can also be understood as an attempt to assure the U.S. of Japan's loyalty in the unfolding competition between China and America. If one recalls the Ancient Roman precept "divide et impera," one wonders if thorough reconciliation among Asian nations really is in America's interest, as continued American dominance over the region is premised on division.
Given all these differences in Germany and Japan's respective geopolitical environments, it is not really fair to explain Japan's failure to become "normal" like Germany by pointing to the different ways in which these two countries have dealt with their past. Perhaps the question of whether Japan is normal should be decided by comparing it not with Germany, but with other nations around the world, most of which find it hard to apologize to the peoples they have victimized in the past. It took France 50 years after Algerian independence before President François Hollande admitted in 2012 that French rule over Algeria had been "profoundly unjust and brutal" – yet he still made a point of not apologizing. Has England apologized for massacres committed during its rule over India? Not yet. Have we heard Italy apologizing for its genocidal campaign in Ethiopia during the 1930s? Or Turkey for the genocide of the Armenians? Don't hold your breath. And all the people of Vietnam have gotten out of the U.S. so far is Robert McNamara's statement that the Vietnam war was "wrong, terribly wrong."
The true tragedy is not that Japan has failed to face its past, but that this failure is so common among the nations of this world that it is normal.
Stefano von Loë is an international business consultant in Hamburg, Germany and has a PhD in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University.