Japan’s No-apology Diplomacy: Why A Small Tokyo Shrine Is Causing Big Trouble In Asia

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/04/23/japans-no-apology-diplomacy-why-a-small-tokyo-shrine-is-causing-big-trouble-in-asia/

 

Posted by Max Fisher on April 23, 2013 at 11:52 am

 

Shinto priests walk in line to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. (Toru Yamanaka/AFP)

Just one year after Emperor Meiji proclaimed the Japanese Empire in 1868, he ordered the construction of a majestic new Shinto shrine in Tokyo. The Yasukuni Shrine was to record the names of every man, woman and child who died in service of the new empire. And it was to be a place of worship, part of a larger effort to make the empire something of a state religion. By the time Japan collapsed in defeat at the end of World War II, more than 2 million names had been added to the shrine.

For more than 75 years, Yasukuni was a symbol of Japan's imperial mission; both were officially sacred. The shrine was considered the final resting place of Japanese soldiers, colonists and others who served the imperial expansion that had plunged all of East Asia and eventually the United States into a costly and horrific war.

When Japan surrendered in 1945 and its imperial era ended, so too, officially, did the state ideology that had been theologically enshrined at Yasukuni. That next April, less than a year after U.S. occupation forces took control of Japan, the Americans ordered Emperor Hirohito to never again visit the shrine or send envoys there, according to Herbert Bix's Pulitzer-winning biography of the emperor. The official symbol of Japan's supposedly divine mission of conquest would remain standing, much like the institution of the emperor himself, but the two could never again meet. Meanwhile, the shrine's keepers continued adding names — including those of high-profile war leaders who were convicted of war crimes and put to death by U.S.-sanctioned tribunals.

In October 1952, shortly after the U.S. occupation ended, Hirohito resumed his visits to worship at Yasukuni. He made seven more trips after that. "It was as if there had been no occupation, or at least no reforms," Bix wrote in his biography. "He was completely indifferent to Yasukuni's disestablishment from the state for its role in channeling religious energy into war."

Like so many of the compromises and contradictions of post-war Japan, Yasukuni's place in the national identity has never been fully resolved. And, like the imperial history that Japan has never addressed quite as fully as did wartime ally Germany, Yasukuni continues to cause trouble.

On Sunday, three high-level Japanese politicians visited Yasukuni, bringing along a wooden token from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who did not visit. China and South Korea, both of which suffered heavily under imperial Japan and who have long accused Japan of refusing to fully atone for or even recognize its wartime abuses, howled in protest. On Tuesday, 168 more Japanese government officials arrived at the shrine, far more than usually attend the annual pilgrimage.

It's hard to overstate just how hated Yasukuni is in East Asia, the degree to which this shrine has become a symbol of Japan's role in the long-held regional tensions that have recently simmered into something a bit more dangerous. In December 2011, a Chinese man attempted to burn the shrine with homemade explosives, a crime he confessed to only when he was later arrested in South Korea for trying to attack the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. But South Korea refused to extradite the man to Japan for imprisonment there, announcing that he would instead be sent home to China after serving a few months' time in Korea. Last month, a restaurant owner in the Chinese city of Hefei became a minor celebrity on the Chinese Web for putting a sign reading "Yasukuni Shrine" over the restaurant's toilets.

The last year has seen rising nationalism in Japan and China, and to a lesser degree in South Korea, lead the countries dangerously close to war over a handful of tiny, disputed islands. The recent visits to Yasukuni seem to have substantially set back the efforts to make up and to have worsened tensions. South Korean officials, including the foreign minister, canceled their visit to Japan in protest over the pilgrimage and Abe's visit to the shrine. Japanese lawmakers said they had to cancel a trip to China because Chinese leader Xi Jinping was being "too difficult" about setting up meetings. A Japanese lawmaker with an opposition party warned that his country was paying a heavy cost for the visits.

Abe's administration has found other ways to infuriate Japan's neighbors and indulge nationalism at home. He has denied the Japanese military's well-documented enlistment of Chinese, Korean and Southeast Asian sex slaves during the war and suggested he may want to "revise" the country's national apology for wartime abuses. A right-wing Japanese think tank has advocated for such moves, urging that Japan abandon what it called "apology diplomacy." The more recent turn might then be called "no-apology diplomacy."

So why do Japanese politicians keep visiting Yasukuni? It's not clear the degree to which they are stoking nationalism or merely riding it to office, although, as in any electoral democracy, the forces of popular sentiment and public leadership aren't always distinct. Whatever the cause, the effect is bad for Japan — the islands disputes, even if they never escalate beyond where they are now, have hurt both diplomacy and trade — and bad for Asia. South Korea and particularly China without question share responsibility for those disputes, although given that the anger and resentment in East Asia can in many ways be traced back to World War II, Japan perhaps holds some special responsibility.

As the historian W.R. Mead wrote on his blog, "Because Japan and China have never been able to have the kind of meeting of the minds and deep reconciliation that Germany and France had after World War II, Asia remains a turbulent and dangerous place."

Turbulent and dangerous might be a tad of an overstatement, and Europe was partially aided by the common cause of the Cold War as well as by Germany's efforts to make amends, but it's true that East Asia is still divided by the memory of the not-so-far-back war that had torn it apart. When Japanese politicians pay tribute to the Yasukuni shrine, they are also paying tribute, whether they intend to or not, to an imperial order in which Japan violently subjugated its neighbors. That era is over: Japan's economy is shrinking and its population declining as both China and South Korea rise in power and stature. Like post-war Europe, it's a place where cooperation and harmony are more likely to serve the interests of individual nations. But as long as Japan's leaders continue living in the past, as Hirohito did when he resumed visiting the imperial shrine to his devastated and discredited empire, they will struggle to prepare their country for its future.

DiaoYuDao(Senkakus) Could Be Undoing Of Asia Pivot

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130416/DEFREG03/304160012/Senkakus-Could-Undoing-Asia-Pivot

DiaoYuDao(Senkakus) Could Be Undoing of Asia Pivot
Would U.S., Japan Go To War With China Over Islands?

Apr. 16, 2013 - 09:27AM   |   By WENDELL MINNICK

 

TAIPEI — America's strategic rebalancing toward the Pacific — known as the "Asia pivot" — could meet its first unwanted test over the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, now being challenged for control by China.

 

Could the Asia pivot's true fulcrum be located on these desolate, rocky outcrops in the East China Sea? China, which calls them the Diaoyu Islands, claims they were stolen from it after World War II. Over the past two years, Beijing has taken aggressive actions to intimidate Japanese Coast Guard vessels in charge of safeguarding the islands' territorial boundaries.

There are concerns an accidental war could be triggered by miscalculation or by China, in the spirit of nationalism, taking a calculated risk by invading the islands.

The question many are asking is: Would Washington fulfill its defense treaty obligations with Japan by taking an active military role to remove Chinese forces from the islands? Or would the U.S. hesitate for political and economic reasons to placate China? If so, what would this mean for regional confidence in America's commitments to peace and stability?

This could be America's "Suez moment," said Paul Giarra, who heads Global Strategies & Transformation, a national defense and strategic planning consulting firm in Washington. It could be the moment when America, hobbled by massive debt, domestic political spasms and the lingering wounds of two exhaustive wars, finally realizes, as did Great Britain during the Suez crisis of 1956, that its ability to fulfill its international strategic commitment in a complex, multipolar world ends.

And if the U.S. fails to uphold its treaty obligations to Japan in such a scenario, could this force Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines to question whether it is in their best interests to cater to a declining superpower that is no longer able to meet the minimum requirements of its pledges during a crisis? Or will the U.S., guided by the lights of a bygone era of being the unilateral superhero, dive into a war with an economic superpower that does not share America's cost-benefit morality or its reciprocal military restraint?

In effect, what would stop China from attacking mainland U.S. targets if the U.S. first attacked land-based ballistic-missile facilities on mainland China?

 

"This becomes a game of chicken," said Dean Cheng, a China specialist at the Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank. "Would the Japanese be willing to attack or sink a Chinese freighter carrying water? What if the Chinese garrison was resupplied by civilian fishing boats, fired up by patriotic fervor?"

Options for Japan

Reaction in Tokyo to a Chinese military takeover of the islands also might spark vacillation. The Japanese government would first go to the United Nations Security Council, on which China and the U.S. sit, "before taking any measures against China," said Yoshi Nakai, a professor of Chinese politics at Gakushuin University, Tokyo.

If the U.S. did not back up Japan's claims with military assistance, the Japanese would be "very disappointed," and "political pressure for the revision of [Japan's pacifist] Constitution would certainly increase," Nakai said.

Masashi Nishihara, president of Japan's Research Institute for Peace and Security, said, "U.S. failure to assist Japan on the Senkakus" would be a "serious blow to the alliance."

For the U.S. to stay out of the conflict would require "some legal gymnastics to explain away repeated assurances that the treaty covers the Senkakus," said Toshi Yoshihara, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College.

Part of the problem in securing U.S. military assistance is the vast range of Chinese invasion scenarios. Nishihara said it could simply be a fleet of Chinese fishing boats that have militia disguised as fishermen who land "en masse" on the disputed islands.

"Because it will not be an armed attack, the security treaty will not be invoked, and the U.S. may not be involved," he said.

Losing the islands to China would cause problems for security in the Western Pacific, Nishihara said.

If China took the islands, it would probably build radar installations and helicopter ports. This would enable China to gather intelligence on Japanese and U.S. military activities in Okinawa and the Sakishima Islands.

Chinese control of the islands also would weaken Japan's front line of defense, Nishihara said. The Taiwan Strait is vital for the U.S. in its defense of Taiwan, and the southwestern island chain is critical to both China and the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

 

China has been using "creeping expansionism" to intimidate Japan in the area, he said. Chinese ships have recently entered the contiguous zone between Japan's Sakishima Islands. Harassment of Japanese Coast Guard vessels by nationalistic Chinese and even Taiwanese fishermen continues in the area.

Nishihara said he believes that China is pressuring Japan to capitulate and drive a wedge into its security partnership with the United States.

Light and Heavy Campaigns

Scenarios abound, Yoshihara said. These include light to heavy campaigns to take the islands. A light campaign would involve rapid seizure of the islands by special operations forces and civilian assets with the goal of catching the Japanese Coast Guard and Navy off guard.

"Civilian vessels could be used to overwhelm the defenses at sea while complicating Japanese rules of engagement," he said. "Militia and military forces could disembark from nonmilitary vessels, allowing the Chinese to land forces and establish some sort of beachhead."

However, once ashore, the Chinese forces would face mounting problems, including the lack of heavy equipment and supplies to dig in and entrench their defensive positions. They may be too light to defend and hold their positions against sustained shore bombardment by Japanese warships and aircraft.

"Moreover, they risk being cut off from resupply if Japan and the United States are able to establish a maritime quarantine around the contested islands. An isolated garrison would not be able to feed itself or rearm. It would then be a matter of time," Yoshihara said.

A heavier military campaign would compel the Chinese to forgo the element of surprise and speed. The preparations for a major amphibious assault on the islands would not escape the attention of Japanese and U.S. intelligence, he said.

"Remember also that Chinese forces would still have to cross the East China Sea to reach the islands," and the "distance between Wenzhou in Zhejiang province and the Senkakus is over 200 miles," Yoshihara said.

 

With sufficient early warning, the Japanese and U.S. navies could be in place to repel such an assault.

If the Chinese could not be pushed off the islands diplomatically or via air or sea bombardment, Japan would not be able to pull off a counter-amphibious assault of its own to dislodge Chinese forces there. Only the U.S. Marine Corps is equipped and trained to conduct forcible entry, Yoshihara said.

A counter-amphibious assault seems unlikely, as Chinese forces on the islands would have had little time to prepare fortifications, Cheng said. Many assume that island battles will be replays of Tarawa and Iwo Jima during World War II, but the Japanese had about a year to prepare Tarawa and even longer for Iwo Jima. This means aerial and sea-based bombardment of the islands would take their toll.

The question remains: Are the Japanese ready to commit to a military engagement with Chinese forces over a couple of rocks? Cheng said he wonders if Japan has honed the command-and-control skills needed. Who would be in charge of such an operation — the Japanese Navy or Army — "for one of the most complex operations" since World War II?

Japanese vacillation and disorganization could give the Chinese Air Force the "upper hand if they can generate more shore-based sorties from airfields on the mainland," Yoshihara said.

The Chinese military also could widen the war by employing its missile forces against Japanese bases to punish Tokyo while avoiding those that host U.S. forces as a stratagem to isolate Japan, he said.

China also could "turn on its larger anti-access force," like the Dong Feng 21D anti-ship ballistic missile, to take out Japanese or even U.S. ships engaging Chinese forces on the islands, Yoshihara said.

"To me, it's a classic problem in war," he said. "It's easy to start a fight, but it's hard to finish it."

What Japanese History Lessons Leave Out

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21226068

What Japanese History Lessons Leave Out

By Mariko Oi

BBC News, Tokyo

 

Japanese people often fail to understand why neighbouring countries harbour a grudge over events that happened in the 1930s and 40s. The reason, in many cases, is that they barely learned any 20th Century history. I myself only got a full picture when I left Japan and went to school in Australia.

From Homo erectus to the present day - more than a million years of history in just one year of lessons. That is how, at the age of 14, I first learned of Japan's relations with the outside world.

For three hours a week - 105 hours over the year - we edged towards the 20th Century.

It's hardly surprising that some classes, in some schools, never get there, and are told by teachers to finish the book in their spare time.

When I returned recently to my old school, Sacred Heart in Tokyo, teachers told me they often have to start hurrying, near the end of the year, to make sure they have time for World War II.

"When I joined Sacred Heart as a teacher, I was asked by the principal to make sure that I teach all the way up to modern history," says my history teacher from Year Eight.

"We have strong ties with our sister schools in the Asian region so we want our students to understand Japan's historical relationship with our neighbouring countries."

I still remember her telling the class, 17 years ago, about the importance of Japan's war history and making the point that many of today's geopolitical tensions stem from what happened then.

Mariko's Japanese textbook: Only a footnote on the Nanjing massacre

I also remember wondering why we couldn't go straight to that period if it was so important, instead of wasting time on the Pleistocene epoch.

When we did finally get there, it turned out only 19 of the book's 357 pages dealt with events between 1931 and 1945.

There was one page on what is known as the Mukden incident, when Japanese soldiers blew up a railway in Manchuria in China in 1931.

There was one page on other events leading up to the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 - including one line, in a footnote, about the massacre that took place when Japanese forces invaded Nanjing - the Nanjing Massacre, or Rape of Nanjing.

There was another sentence on the Koreans and the Chinese who were brought to Japan as miners during the war, and one line, again in a footnote, on "comfort women" - a prostitution corps created by the Imperial Army of Japan.

There was also just one sentence on the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

I wanted to know more, but was not quite eager enough to delve into the subject in my spare time. As a teenager, I was more interested in fashion and boys.

My friends had a chance to choose world history as a subject in Year 11. But by that stage I had left the Japanese schooling system, and was living in Australia.

I remember the excitement when I noticed that instead of ploughing chronologically through a given period, classes would focus on a handful of crucial events in world history.

Nanjing massacre, 1937-38

• A six-week period of bloodshed, after the Japanese capture of the city in December 1937
• International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), set up after WWII, estimated more than 200,000 people were killed, including many women and children
• Dispute over scale of atrocity remains a sticking point in Chinese/Japanese relations - some Japanese question whether a massacre took place

So brushing aside my teacher's objection that I would struggle with the high volume of reading and writing in English - a language I could barely converse in - I picked history as one of my subjects for the international baccalaureate.

My first ever essay in English was on the Rape of Nanjing.

There is controversy over what happened. The Chinese say 300,000 were killed and many women were gang-raped by the Japanese soldiers, but as I spent six months researching all sides of the argument, I learned that some in Japan deny the incident altogether.

Nobukatsu Fujioka is one of them and the author of one of the books that I read as part of my research.

"It was a battlefield so people were killed but there was no systematic massacre or rape," he says, when I meet him in Tokyo.

"The Chinese government hired actors and actresses, pretending to be the victims when they invited some Japanese journalists to write about them.

"All of the photographs that China uses as evidence of the massacre are fabricated because the same picture of decapitated heads, for example, has emerged as a photograph from the civil war between Kuomintang and Communist parties."

As a 17-year-old student, I was not trying to make a definitive judgement on what exactly happened, but reading a dozen books on the incident at least allowed me to understand why many people in China still feel bitter about Japan's military past.

 

"All of the photographs that China uses as evidence of the massacre are fabricated"  ---  Nobukatsu Fujioka

While school pupils in Japan may read just one line on the massacre, children in China are taught in detail not just about the Rape of Nanjing but numerous other Japanese war crimes, though these accounts of the war are sometimes criticised for being overly anti-Japanese.

The same can be said about South Korea, where the education system places great emphasis on our modern history. This has resulted in very different perceptions of the same events in countries an hour's flying time apart.

One of the most contentious topics there is the comfort women.

Fujioka believes they were paid prostitutes. But Japan's neighbours, such as South Korea and Taiwan, say they were forced to work as sex slaves for the Japanese army.

Without knowing these debates, it is extremely difficult to grasp why recent territorial disputes with China or South Korea cause such an emotional reaction among our neighbours. The sheer hostility shown towards Japan by ordinary people in street demonstrations seems bewildering and even barbaric to many Japanese television viewers.

Equally, Japanese people often find it hard to grasp why politicians' visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine - which honours war criminals among other Japanese soldiers - cause quite so much anger.

 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in 2012

I asked the children of some friends and colleagues how much history they had picked up during their school years.

Twenty-year-old university student Nami Yoshida and her older sister Mai - both undergraduates studying science - say they haven't heard about comfort women.

"I've heard of the Nanjing massacre but I don't know what it's about," they both say.

"At school, we learn more about what happened a long time ago, like the samurai era," Nami adds.

Seventeen-year-old Yuki Tsukamoto says the "Mukden incident" and Japan's invasion of the Korean peninsula in the late 16th Century help to explain Japan's unpopularity in the region.

"I think it is understandable that some people are upset, because no-one wants their own country to be invaded," he says.

But he too is unaware of the plight of the comfort women.

 Chinese protesters often mark anniversaries of 20th Century clashes with Japan

Former history teacher and scholar Tamaki Matsuoka holds Japan's education system responsible for a number of the country's foreign relations difficulties.

"Our system has been creating young people who get annoyed by all the complaints that China and South Korea make about war atrocities because they are not taught what they are complaining about," she said.

"It is very dangerous because some of them may resort to the internet to get more information and then they start believing the nationalists' views that Japan did nothing wrong."

I first saw her work, based on interviews with Japanese soldiers who invaded Nanjing, when I visited the museum in the city a few years ago.

"There were many testimonies by the victims but I thought we needed to hear from the soldiers," she says.

"It took me many years but I interviewed 250 of them. Many initially refused to talk, but eventually, they admitted to killing, stealing and raping."

Matsuoka accuses the government of a deliberate silence about atrocities

When I saw her video interviews of the soldiers, it was not just their admission of war crimes which shocked me, it was their age. Already elderly by the time she interviewed them, many had been barely 20 at the time, and in a strange way, it humanised them.

I was choked with an extremely complex emotion. Sad to see Japan repeatedly described as evil and dubbed "the devil", and nervous because I wondered how people around me would react if they knew I was Japanese. But there was also the big question why - what drove these young soldiers to kill and rape?

When Matsuoka published her book, she received many threats from nationalist groups.

She and Fujioka represent two opposing camps in a debate about what should be taught in Japanese schools.

Fujioka and his Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform say most textbooks are "masochistic" and only teach about Japan in negative light.

Comfort women

• 200,000 women in territories occupied by Japan during WWII estimated to have been forced into become sex slaves for troops, or "comfort women"
• In 1993 Japan acknowledged use of wartime brothels
• In 2007 Japanese PM Shinzo Abe was forced to apologise after casting doubt on the existence of comfort women

"The Japanese textbook authorisation system has the so-called "neighbouring country clause" which means that textbooks have to show understanding in their treatment of historical events involving neighbouring Asian countries. It is just ridiculous," he says.

He is widely known for pressuring politicians to remove the term "comfort women" from all the junior high school textbooks. His first textbook, which won government approval in 2001, made a brief reference to the death of Chinese soldiers and civilians in Nanjing, but he plans to tone it down further in his next book.

But is ignorance the solution?

The Ministry of Education's guidelines for junior high schools state that all children must be taught about Japan's "historical relations with its Asian neighbours and the catastrophic damage caused by the World War II to humanity at large".

"That means schools have to teach about the Japanese military's increased influence and extension of its power [in the 1930s] and the prolonged war in China," says ministry spokesman Akihiko Horiuchi.

History tuition in Japan

• Students first learn about Japanese history in Year Six, over 105 hours of lessons
• In Year Eight of junior high school, they study the history of Japan's relations with the rest of the world - this course now lasts for 130 hours
• Seven history textbooks are approved by the Education Ministry - schools can choose which they use
• Students can also choose to study World History in Year 11

"Students learn about the extent of the damage caused by Japan in many countries during the war as well as sufferings that the Japanese people had to experience especially in Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Okinawa in order to understand the importance of international co-operation and peace.

"Based on our guideline, each school decides which specific events they focus on depending on the areas and the situation of the school and the students' maturity."

Matsuoka, however, thinks the government deliberately tries not to teach young people the details of Japan's atrocities.

Having experienced history education in two countries, the way history is taught in Japan has at least one advantage - students come away with a comprehensive understanding of when events happened, in what order.

In many ways, my schoolfriends and I were lucky. Because junior high students were all but guaranteed a place in the senior high school, not many had to go through what's often described as the "examination war".

For students who are competing to get into a good senior high school or university, the race is extremely tough and requires memorisation of hundreds of historical dates, on top of all the other subjects that have to be studied.

They have no time to dwell on a few pages of war atrocities, even if they read them in their textbooks.

All this has resulted in Japan's Asian neighbours - especially China and South Korea - accusing the country of glossing over its war atrocities.

Meanwhile, Japan's new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe criticises China's school curriculum for being too "anti-Japanese".

He, like Fujioka, wants to change how history is taught in Japan so that children can be proud of our past, and is considering revising Japan's 1993 apology over the comfort women issue.

If and when that happens, it will undoubtedly cause a huge stir with our Asian neighbours. And yet, many Japanese will have no clue why it is such a big deal.

Textbook crisis

In 2005, protests were sparked in China and South Korea by a textbook prepared by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, which had been approved by the government in 2001.

Foreign critics said it whitewashed Japan's war record during the 1930s and early 1940s.

It referred to the Nanjing massacre as an "incident", and glossed over the issue of comfort women.

The book was not used in many schools, but was a big commercial success.

 

China Survives A Big Year

http://www.todayonline.com/CommentaryandAnalysis/Commentary/EDC121228-0000023/China-survives-a-big-year

 

China survives a big year
by Noah Feldman 04:45 AM Dec 28, 2012

 

The year 2012 will go into the history books as one of contrasting transitions. China's five-year cycle for Communist Party congresses and leadership turnover overlapped with the United States' four-year electoral calendar.

And if that once-in-20-years coincidence was not enough, Egypt's rocky shift from dictatorship to democracy continues to remind us of what transition looks like in the absence of a predictable institutional framework.

The confluence of Chinese and American transitions marks an extraordinary historic development. The last time this happened, we might not have been able to predict the impeachment of Mr Bill Clinton or the Supreme Court deciding the 2000 presidential election in George W Bush versus Al Gore.

But any reasonable observer would have expected that presidential elections would continue in their ordinary course, and that the crises associated with impeachment and an uncertain electoral outcome would be resolved in a regular fashion, not by palace coups or purges.

By contrast, in 1992 it would have been essentially impossible to predict that China would soon embark on a regularised process for replacing the leadership of the Communist Party based on generational turnover.

 

PLANNED RETIREMENT

 

Five-year plans were nothing new - the Chinese had inherited them from the Soviets - but top leadership change did not follow that regular clock.

Neither the oscillations of power that accompanied the Cultural Revolution nor the Tiananmen upheavals (both before and after the events of June 4, 1989) followed a predictable calendar.

Although the generation of Deng Xiaoping officially "retired" in 1992, no one thought this meant its members would actually relinquish political authority.

In short, China was still ruled as a quasi-dictatorship. As a result, it was plagued by dictatorship-style uncertainty about who would come to power next, when, and how.

Over the past two decades, the situation has changed fundamentally. Gradually, after Deng's death, it has become normal for China's leaders to stand aside when their decade in office is done.

As a result, observers in China and outside can now speculate with some confidence about who will come to power and when. Everyone knew that Mr Xi Jinping and Mr Li Keqiang would form the centre of the new administration more than two years before they assumed office.

At the same time, the selection of officials throughout the Communist Party apparatus increasingly takes account of performance, not only loyalty to party discipline.

 

A REMARKABLE EXPERIMENT

 

Although recent studies suggest -unsurprisingly - that the meritocracy is far from perfect, it is broadly understood that the party members who specialise in the selection process try to advance cadres' careers based on a mix of their talents, accomplishments, networks and commitment to the party.

Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that China's most senior leadership engaged in a remarkable experiment. Through the system of internal selection and generational turnover, the party is trying to solve the problem of transitions without relying either on democratic elections or pure hereditary power.

There are many sons and daughters of senior party members whose family connections have aided their rise, but to be a princeling is not enough: You also have to be good.

The upshot of these changes is that while China is still authoritarian, it is no longer a dictatorship.

Dictators do not cede power voluntarily, as the Arab Spring reminds us. And if a new dictator does not emerge, the system can be thrown into near- chaos - a process still playing out in Egypt.

 

CONSERVATISM RULES

 

Some observers this year thought that the Communist Party apparatus was so focused on the transition - on figuring out who was in and who was out - that its leaders neglected pressing economic concerns.

That might be true. Yet it is not so different from the situation in the US, where the direction of the economy and the precarious fiscal situation took a back seat for most of the long presidential campaign. Stable transitions tend to be elaborate, and elaborate transitions take time, effort and money.

At least the Chinese did not waste upward of US$2 billion (S$2.4 billion) on campaign advertising.

The new reality of transitional stability in China tells us something crucial about how the new leadership will govern. Hard-won stability is an asset that the leadership has inherited and will not want to squander.

Rapid change of any kind will, therefore, be anathema.

Conservatism, not rapid reform, will be the order of the day.

Deng's generation faced a major legitimacy challenge as the Soviet Union collapsed and traditional communist ideology was shown to be bankrupt. A serious crisis demanded bold measures, and the changes were far-reaching and rapid.

Now, the party's leaders have much more to lose - including the tremendous asset of predictable transitions.

 

THE MILITARY FACTOR

 

Of course, even conservative leaders have to keep their base satisfied. Mr Xi has closer ties to the People's Liberation Army than did his predecessors, and so is likely to be more hawkish. This closeness is reflected in his immediate assumption of the reins of the military - unlike the last President, who waited two years.

Mr Xi probably would not rapidly militarise the conflict with Japan around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands - that would be insufficiently conservative - but with the army in his camp, he is also not going to back down.

Yet here, too, China's stability coming out of transition is historically noteworthy. Mr Xi needs the military, but he does not fear it in the way that Egypt's Mohamed Morsi must fear the army that both produced and deposed his predecessor. When it comes to civilian control of the military, China is now more like the US than like a developing-world dictatorship.

China is not on the royal road to democracy or to capitalism without major state direction. But this year, it reaped the benefits of its historic move away from dictatorship - and in historical and comparative terms, that is impressive enough. BLOOMBERG

 

 

Noah Feldman, a law professor at Harvard University and the author of Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR's Great Supreme Court Justices, is a Bloomberg View columnist.

Is Japan Risking War To Save The U.S.-Japan Alliance?

http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2012/11/07/is-japan-risking-war-to-save-the-u-s-japan-alliance/

Was Japan's so-far disastrous nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands a "miscalculation" of China's likely response, or was it a deliberate, desperate, almost kamikaze-like lunge to save the U.S.-Japan security alliance?

Map of the world with China-Japan-South Korea participating in trilateral meeting are highlighted in PR China , Japan , and South Korea . (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

**************Map Of TaiWan Should Also Is Red**************

I believe that it was the latter.  That Japan—and here I mean not just the Japan Democratic Party (DPJ) Noda cabinet, but also the ministry of foreign affairs (MOFA) and self-defense forces (SDF) bureaucracies, and, particularly, the factions within the main opposition Liberal Democratic Party (DPJ) and nationalists allied with former Tokyo major Ishihara Shintaro—did not expect a ferocious response from China, including shows of naval force and threats of occupation, is not credible.

On June 6, Japan's ambassador to China, Niwa Uichiro, went public in the Financial Times, warning that the nationalization would be spark an "extremely grave crisis" in relations, causing "decades of past effort to be brought to nothing."  Niwa, a former CEO and Chairman of  Itochu Corporation,  certainly had been raising the alarm in even starker terms internally to the Noda cabinet and the MOFA, as well as to Japan's politically powerful big business establishment.

And there was not the least ambiguity or diffidence in China's position, stated publicly and through diplomatic channels over the past several years, including the day before the September 12 nationalization decision when Hu Jintao and Noda stood face-to-face on the fringe of the APEC meeting in Vladivostok.

That the ensuing crisis would be particularly destabilizing and dangerously unpredictable in its ultimate costs to Japan was ensured by the contemporaneous decennial leadership change in China, extending throughout both the Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army, of which only the vaguest picture is being revealed in the 18^th Party Congress which begins today, November 8, in Beijing.

The nationalization decision has so far fueled an explosion of anti-Japan sentiment, demonstrations like the one I witnessed in Shanghai, wide-spread vandalism against Japanese businesses, and popular boycott of purchases of Japanese products, particularly automobiles.   Officially directed anti-Japanese actions have included stalled customs clearances, cancelled or deferred commercial contract negotiations, cancelled exhibitions and delegation exchanges.

Japan's auto industry has been the most damaged, particularly Nissan for which the China market accounted for 26% of total global vehicle unit sales in FY 2011, and Honda which sold 20% of its cars in China (the figure for Toyota is 12%).  Nissan's Chief Operating Officer on November 6 that this fiscal years' operating profit forecast was being cut by JPY 60 billion (USD 750 million) because of a drop in China sales.  It could get worse.

But what is more worrisome that the impact on any specific industries, is the inherent intractability of a territorial issue like Senkaku/Diaoyu between two countries once the issue is inflamed, and the longer term obstacles this creates for continued integration of Japan's economy with that of Asia's other major power, China, an imperative for Japan's future growth and prosperity.  As tensions and the frequency of dueling Coast Guard patrols in the Senkaku/Diaoyu area have increased, so have combative diplomatic exchanges, slights and insults, and—on both sides—a torrent of books and articles whose themes recall the nightmarish era of Japan-China war.

What could, from Japan's perspective, possibly have justified and motivated such a hugely costly and dangerous course?

The answer I think is fairly clear:  it was the course most likely to block and forestall what the prevailing conservative establishment sees as a greater threat:  That the U.S. and China have been moving toward a new, shared East Asian power paradigm in which the U.S.-Japan defense alliance is abandoned and Japan is forced to defend itself alone or to abandon defense and rely on "soft power" to defend its interests.

As I have presented in this blog before, reviewing recent books by Australian strategist Hugh White (see my post) and Professor Yabuki Susumu (here), the interests of both China and, particularly, the U.S. are now clearly to forge such a "new strategic architecture" in Asia.  What Professor White points out in The China Choice:  Why America Should Share Power is an agreement between the U.S. and China to share power would require that the U.S. decouple its military resources from Japan's, ending the alliance. He correctly states that Japan, of all the affected countries, will find the new order the most unwelcome and difficult to accommodate.

Japan's Senkaku/Diaoyu island nationalization gambit eloquently speaks to this difficulty, and the lengths to which Japan may think it must go to keep the U.S. engaged in supporting the alliance against a "China threat."  Of course, there is a huge vested interest in the U.S. Department of Defense in maintaining the status quo, expressed inter alia through studies like the CSIS Armitage-Nye report.

This week the SDF and U.S. Navy and Air Force launched a massive 16-day joint exercise off the southern islands of Kyushu and Okinawa involving 47,000 men (10,000 Americans), 30 ships, a U.S. carrier, and 240 aircraft.  The exercise is simulating an attack on Japan's islands from an "unknown power," but the unspoken target is clear.

The problem with this, as Professor Yabuki has written, is that the U.S.-Japan "alliance" has lost any positive relevance for Japan's security, and in fact is inimical to Japan's interests.  Could there be any more eloquent testimony to this reality than consequences of the Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis?  Nor, for reasons presented clearly by Professor White, is the alliance in the U.S.'s long term interest.

What we have witnessed in this dispute is a historical mistake and tragedy.  But history is moving on, and is likely to accelerate following Obama's re-election and the China's 18^th Party Congress.  Japan is going to have to accept that its world has changed.

US Risks Losing Neutrality Over DiaoYu

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/739765.shtml

Illustration: Liu Rui

The US has over two centuries of experience with the East and South China seas, but the passage of time and the Cold War dimmed memories about the Diaoyu Islands. Today, Washington must adopt a strictly impartial position on the longstanding dispute between China and Japan, and should support a peaceful diplomatic process to resolve the issue over time.

Some make a false claim that the US historically considered the Diaoyu Islands part of the Ryukyu Islands, today's Okinawa Prefecture. But the record shows otherwise.

The expedition of US Commodore Matthew Perry famously opened up Japan, and that to this end the US and Japan signed the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854.

It is not remembered that Perry also negotiated a Convention in 1854 with what was then called "Lew Chew" (Liu Chiu). At the time, it was well known that the Diaoyu Islands were not part of the historic Ryukyu kingdom, composed of 36 islands.

The official results of the Perry expedition were presented to the US Congress, and to the world, through the publication of a comprehensive report in three volumes which included maps and naval charts. These maps and charts of the Ryukyu Islands did not include the Diaoyu Islands. Significantly, the convention was written in the Chinese language.

From an Asian perspective, on the one hand, the kingdom was within the traditional East Asian tribute system centered on China. On the other hand, Japanese warlords asserted influence. Perry and the US government were aware of these issues. 

Japan unilaterally changed the status of its relationship with Liu Chiu in the 1870s and then annexed it in 1879. The US Department of State raised concerns with Tokyo about the status of "Lew Chew" and US rights under the 1854 agreement with the kingdom. 

In 1879, General Ulysses S. Grant, a former president of the US, visited China and Japan on his around the world tour. Tensions between China and Japan over the Liu Chiu situation were high and some thought war was possible.

Grant, as a private citizen who was strictly impartial, encouraged both sides to solve the matter peacefully through diplomacy.

In China, General Grant had extensive discussions in a friendly atmosphere with such high officials as Prince Gong and Viceroy Li Hongzhang. The Liu Chiu issue was discussed in detail. 

General Grant's visit and the Liu Chiu crisis were extensively covered in the newspapers of the day in China and around the world.

At that time, some suggested a compromise arrangement where the central group of the Ryukyu Islands would become a neutral kingdom, the northern group would go to Japan, and the southern group would go to China.

Japanese imperialism and the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 further complicated the situation. Then during World War II, the US liberated the Ryukyu Islands at a cost of 12,000 American lives.  

As the Cold War set in, the Ryukyu Islands were a key strategic consideration for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. For reasons of national security the US chose to retain these islands, particularly Okinawa, in a strategic trusteeship. 

At this time, however, the US government appears to have become unclear about the historical situation in the area south of 29 degrees north latitude. Strong pressures to lean toward the Japanese side to induce Tokyo to join the Western side in the Cold War led to mistakes.

Suddenly, the Korean War (1950-53) sharply exacerbated Cold War tensions and heightened security considerations regarding the Ryukyu Islands and the region.

Under these circumstances, the US assigned the Diaoyu Islands to the Ryukyu Islands for administrative and security purposes, although they could have been assigned to Taiwan, with which the US was friendly. 

This administrative move involving the Diaoyu Islands, based on perceived military necessity, did not signify that the US considered the Diaoyu Islands a historical part of the Ryukyu Islands or that the US took a legal position on outstanding territorial disputes between China and Japan.

In 1971, the US Senate approved the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. The US Senate records indicate that it understood the longstanding historical and legal dispute over the Diaoyu Islands and that it did not take a side on this matter in the passing of the these islands to Japanese administration. There was opposition to reversion in the Senate and in the US. 

Today, at a time of intense controversy over the Diaoyu Islands, Washington includes the Diaoyu Islands within the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the US. For many, such a disruptive tilt toward Tokyo signals that Washington is far from neutral in this dispute.

Washington must take a strictly impartial position so that China and Japan over time may resolve their differences according to international law and in a peaceful manner through diplomacy.

The author is an educator and former senior professional staff member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

Menacing Things Come In Threes

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsurf/articles/20121013.aspx

October 13, 2012: Recent photos from China show three 1,500 ton coastal patrol ships ("cutters" in American parlance) being built simultaneously, next to each other. This is part of a 36 ship order, in part to help the domestic ship building industry, for the China Marine Surveillance (CMS). Seven of the new ships are the size of corvettes (1,500 tons), while the rest are smaller (15 are 1,000 ton ships and 14 are 600 tons). The global economic recession has hit shipbuilding particularly hard over the last four years and China is one of the top three shipbuilding nations in the world. For a long time coastal patrol was carried out by navy cast-offs. But in the last decade the coastal patrol force has been getting more and more new ships (as well as more retired navy small ships). Delivery of all 36 CMS ships is to be completed in the next two years.

The CMS service is one of five Chinese organizations responsible for law enforcement along the coast. The others are the Coast Guard, which is a military force that constantly patrols the coasts. The Maritime Safety Administration handles search and rescue along the coast. The Fisheries Law Enforcement Command polices fishing grounds. The Customs Service polices smuggling. China has multiple coastal patrol organizations because it is the custom in communist dictatorships to have more than one security organization doing the same task, so each outfit can keep an eye on the other.

CMS is the most recent of these agencies, having been established in 1998. It is actually the police force for the Chinese Oceanic Administration, which is responsible for surveying non-territorial waters that China has economic control over (the exclusive economic zones or EEZ) and for enforcing environmental laws in its coastal waters. The new program will expand the CMS strength from 9,000 to 10,000 personnel. CMS already has 300 boats and ten aircraft. In addition, CMS collects and coordinates data from marine surveillance activities in ten large coastal cities and 170 coastal counties. When there is an armed confrontation over contested islands in the South China Sea, it's usually CMS patrol boats that are frequently described as "Chinese warships."

Thus the current expansion is mostly about the EEZ and patrolling it more frequently and aggressively. International law (the 1994 Law of the Sea treaty) recognizes the waters 22 kilometers from land as under the jurisdiction of the nation controlling the nearest land. That means ships cannot enter these "territorial waters" without permission. However, the waters 360 kilometers from land are considered the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the nation controlling the nearest land. The EEZ owner can control who fishes there and extracts natural resources (mostly oil and gas) from the ocean floor. But the EEZ owner cannot prohibit free passage or the laying of pipelines and communications cables. China has already claimed that foreign ships have been conducting illegal espionage in their EEZ. But the 1994 treaty says nothing about such matters. China is simply doing what China has been doing for centuries, trying to impose its will on neighbors or anyone venturing into what China considers areas under its control.

For the last two centuries China has been prevented from exercising its "traditional rights" in nearby waters because of the superior power of foreign navies (first the cannon armed European sailing ships, then, in the 19th century, newly built steel warships from Japan). However, since the communists took over China 60 years ago, there have been increasingly violent attempts to reassert Chinese control over areas that have long (for centuries) been considered part of the "Middle Kingdom" (or China, as in the "center of the world").

China is particularly concerned about the nearby Spratlys, a group of some 100 islets, atolls, and reefs that total only about 5 square kilometers of land but sprawl across some 410,000 square kilometers of the South China Sea. Set amid some of the world's most productive fishing grounds, the islands are believed to have enormous underwater oil and gas reserves. Several nations have overlapping claims on the group. About 45 of the islands are currently occupied by small numbers of military personnel. China claims them all but occupies only 8, Vietnam has occupied or marked 25, the Philippines 8, Malaysia 6, and Taiwan one.

China prefers to use non-military or paramilitary ships (like those of the CMS) to harass foreign ships it wants out of the EEZ or disputed warfare. This approach is less likely to spark an armed conflict and makes it easier for the Chinese to claim they were the victims.

China Leaves 1962 Military Triumph's Shadow Behind

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-leaves-1962-military-triumphs-shadow-behind/articleshow/16775213.cms

BEIJING: It's not denial, and it's not amnesia, but the Chinese never gloat over the country's military triumph in the 1962 war with India. No one talks about the conflict here; there's no section of a museum, no memorials in China to display a sense of national bravado, and nothing like Tokyo's Yasukuni shrine.

A Chinese soldier shares light moment with an Indian officer at Nathu La on the India-China border. The Chinese never gloat over the country's military triumph in the 1962 war with India.

The Yasukuni shrine continues to embarrass the Chinese, who see in Japan's obsession for "war heroes" a glorification of "war criminals" involved in rape and massacre of innocent citizens after the southern city of Nanjing fell into the hands of the Japanese army in 1937. There has been no such attempt in China to embarrass India over the 1962 conflict.

"China never wanted to humiliate India. It has been wrongly understood in India," said Janaki Ballabh, who came to Beijing as a copy editor with the Foreign Languages Press in 1956. "My Chinese friends feel sad that the two countries had to go to war. The war has not changed the love and respect that ordinary Chinese have for India," Ballabh said. Government experts sound almost apologetic about the war success and tend to explain it in ways that is hardly ever discussed in India. This is evident in several articles in Chinese journals through the past decades, including a recent one in the Global Times last June.

"Then Chinese leader Mao Zedong believed the battle with India was also a political combat, and the real target was not Nehru but the US and the Soviets that had been plotting behind the scenes against China," wrote Hong Yuan, a deputy secretary-general and researcher with the Center of World Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in the Global Times.

"As to Nehru, Mao wanted to wake him up from the superpowers' influence by giving him a heavy punch, so that he would come to his senses and end the war," Hong wrote, outlining the Chinese official version of history.

Beijing prefers to blame the United States for the Dalai Lama's escape to India in 1959, and even the 1962 war with India. This was evident in a speech by Xuecheng Liu, a senior fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, during a workshop on 'Revisit Sino-Indian Border Dispute' at London's Westminster University in 2010.

"The CIA-supported revolt in Tibet, India-embraced Dalai Lama, and India-hosted Tibetan Government-in-exile turned out to be one of the causes of the border war in 1962," Xuecheng said. "Then the China-India relationship dramatically moved toward hostility and confrontation from brotherhood and friendship and entered an era of cold war which lasted nearly two decades."

The situation has changed and "China and India do not pose a threat to each other and their common interests far outweigh their differences," Xuecheng said, ending his speech with: "A good China-India relationship makes both winners while a confrontational one makes both losers."

Similar refrain is heard in several speeches and articles by Chinese government officials and experts, who are trying to persuade both sides to move away from the shadow of history and take determined steps towards friendship. "The Sino-Indian border war was not only a special interaction of two ancient civilizations, but also an unfortunate tragedy between two formerly colonized and oppressed states," the Communist Party organ, People's Daily, said in an article by Li Hongmei in 2010.

"Fortunately, the sober-minded people on both sides would prefer to avoid being dragged down by the past. Instead, they have been making every effort to achieve a reasonable and just settlement of the territory in dispute and turn to a broader cooperation gearing to future," the article said.

The Inconvenient Truth Behind The DiaoYu/Senkaku Islands

http://cn.nytimes.com/article/opinion/2012/09/28/c28shaw/en/

The Inconvenient Truth Behind The DiaoYu/Senkaku Islands

By HAN-YI SHAW September 28, 2012

Han-yi Shaw Diaoyu Island is recorded under Kavalan, Taiwan in Revised Gazetteer of Fujian Province (1871).

I've had a longstanding interest in the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the subject of a dangerous territorial dispute  between Japan and China. The United States claims to be neutral but in effect is siding with Japan, and we could be drawn in if a war ever arose. Let me clear that I deplore the violence in the recent anti-Japan protests in China:  the violence is reprehensible and makes China look like an irrational bully. China's government should rein in this volatile nationalism rather than feed it. This is a dispute that both sides should refer to the International Court of Justice, rather than allow to boil over in the streets. That said, when I look at the underlying question of who has the best claim, I'm sympathetic to China's position. I don't think it is 100 percent clear, partly because China seemed to acquiesce to Japanese sovereignty between 1945 and 1970, but on balance I find the evidence for Chinese sovereignty quite compelling. The most interesting evidence is emerging from old Japanese government documents and suggests that Japan in effect stole the islands from China in 1895 as booty of war. This article by Han-Yi Shaw, a scholar from Taiwan, explores those documents. I invite any Japanese scholars to make the contrary legal case. – Nicholas Kristof

Japan's recent purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has predictably reignited tensions amongst China, Japan, and Taiwan. Three months ago, when Niwa Uichiro, the Japanese ambassador to China, warned that Japan's purchase of the islands could spark an "extremely grave crisis" between China and Japan, Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro slammed Niwa as an unqualified ambassador , who "needs to learn more about the history of his own country".

Ambassador Niwa was forced to apologize for his remarks and was recently replaced. But what is most alarming amid these developments is that despite Japan's democratic and pluralist society, rising nationalist sentiments are sidelining moderate views and preventing rational dialogue.

The Japanese government maintains that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are Japanese territory under international law and historical point of view and has repeatedly insisted that no dispute exists . Despite that the rest of the world sees a major dispute, the Japanese government continues to evade important historical facts behind its unlawful incorporation of the islands in 1895.

Specifically, the Japanese government asserts, "From 1885 on, our government conducted on-site surveys time and again, which confirmed that the islands were uninhabited and there were no signs of control by the Qing Empire."

My research of over 40 official Meiji period documents unearthed from the Japanese National Archives, Diplomatic Records Office, and National Institute for Defense Studies Library clearly demonstrates that the Meiji government acknowledged Chinese ownership of the islands back in 1885.

Following the first on-site survey, in 1885, the Japanese foreign minister wrote, "Chinese newspapers have been reporting rumors of our intention of occupying islands belonging to China located next to Taiwan.… At this time, if we were to publicly place national markers, this must necessarily invite China's suspicion.…"

In November 1885, the Okinawa governor confirmed "since this matter is not unrelated to China, if problems do arise I would be in grave repentance for my responsibility".

"Surveys of the islands are incomplete" wrote the new Okinawa governor in January of 1892. He requested that a naval ship Kaimon be sent to survey the islands, but ultimately a combination of miscommunication and bad weather made it impossible for the survey to take place.

Japan Diplomatic Records Office. Letter dated May 12, 1894 affirming that the Meiji government did not repeatedly investigate the disputed islands.  

"Ever since the islands were investigated by Okinawa police agencies back in 1885, there have been no subsequent field surveys conducted," the Okinawa governor wrote in 1894.

After a number of Chinese defeats in the Sino-Japanese War, a report from Japan's Home Ministry said "this matter involved negotiations with China… but the situation today is greatly different from back then." The Meiji government, following a cabinet decision in early 1895, promptly incorporated the islands.

Negotiations with China never took place and this decision was passed during the Sino-Japanese War. It was never made public.

In his biography Koga Tatsushiro, the first Japanese citizen to lease the islands from the Meiji government, attributed Japan's possession of the islands to "the gallant military victory of our Imperial forces."

Collectively, these official documents leave no doubt that the Meiji government did not base its occupation of the islands following "on-site surveys time and again," but instead annexed them as booty of war. This is the inconvenient truth that the Japanese government has conveniently evaded.

Japan asserts that neither Beijing nor Taipei objected to U.S. administration after WWII. That's true, but what Japan does not mention is that neither Beijing nor Taipei were invited as signatories of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, from which the U.S. derived administrative rights.

When Japan annexed the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 1895, it detached them from Taiwan and placed them under Okinawa Prefecture. Moreover, the Japanese name "Senkaku Islands" itself was first introduced in 1900 by academic Kuroiwa Hisashi and adopted by the Japanese government thereafter. Half a century later when Japan returned Taiwan to China, both sides adopted the 1945 administrative arrangement of Taiwan, with the Chinese unaware that the uninhabited "Senkaku Islands" were in fact the former Diaoyu Islands. This explains the belated protest from Taipei and Beijing over U.S. administration of the islands after the war.

Report dated August 12, 1892 from navy commander affirming the islands were not fully investigated. Source:  Library of The National Institute for Defense Studies.

The Japanese government frequently cites two documents as evidence that China did not consider the islands to be Chinese. The first is an official letter from a Chinese consul in Nagasaki dated May 20, 1920 that listed the islands as Japanese territory.

Neither Beijing nor Taipei dispute that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands — along with the entire island of Taiwan — were formally under Japanese occupation at the time. However, per post-WW II arrangements, Japan was required to surrender territories obtained from aggression and revert them to their pre-1895 legal status.

The second piece evidence is a Chinese map from 1958 that excludes the Senkaku Islands from Chinese territory. But the Japanese government's partial unveiling leaves out important information from the map's colophon: "certain national boundaries are based on maps compiled prior to the Second Sino-Japanese War(1937-1945)."

Qing period (1644-1911) records substantiate Chinese ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands prior to 1895. Envoy documents indicate that the islands reside inside the "border that separates Chinese and foreign lands." And according to Taiwan gazetteers, "Diaoyu Island accommodates ten or more large ships" under the jurisdiction of Kavalan, Taiwan.

The right to know is the bedrock of every democracy. The Japanese public deserves to know the other side of the story. It is the politicians who flame public sentiments under the name of national interests who pose the greatest risk, not the islands themselves.

Update: The author would like to include an updated image of the Qing era documents that recorded, "Diaoyutai Island accommodates ten or more large ships", as mentioned in his blog post.

National Palace Museum, Taipei, Taiwan. Record of Missions to Taiwan Waters (1722), Gazetteer of Kavalan County (1852), and Pictorial Treatise of Taiwan Proper (1872).

Han-Yi Shaw is a Research Fellow at the Research Center for International Legal Studies, National Chengchi University, in Taipei, Taiwan.

DiaoYuDao , An Inherent Territory Of China

DiaoYu Dao, An Inherent Territory Of China

(September 2012)

State Council Information Office
The People's Republic Of China

 

Contents

Foreword

I. DiaoYu Dao Is China's Inherent Territory

II. Japan Grabbed DiaoYu Dao From China

III. Backroom Deals Between The United States And Japan Concerning DiaoYu Dao Are Illegal And Invalid

IV. Japan's Claim Of Sovereignty Over DiaoYu Dao Is Totally Unfounded

V. China Has Taken Resolute Measures To Safeguard Its Sovereignty Over DiaoYu Dao

Conclusion

Foreword

Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands are an inseparable part of the Chinese territory. Diaoyu Dao is China's inherent territory in all historical, geographical and legal terms, and China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao.

Japan's occupation of Diaoyu Dao during the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 is illegal and invalid. After World War II, Diaoyu Dao was returned to China in accordance with such international legal documents as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. No matter what unilateral step Japan takes over Diaoyu Dao, it will not change the fact that Diaoyu Dao belongs to China. For quite some time, Japan has repeatedly stirred up troubles on the issue of Diaoyu Dao. On September 10, 2012, the Japanese government announced the "purchase" of Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated Nanxiao Dao and Beixiao Dao and the implementation of the so-called "nationalization". This is a move that grossly violates China's territorial sovereignty and seriously tramples on historical facts and international jurisprudence.

China is firmly opposed to Japan's violation of China's sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao in whatever form and has taken resolute measures to curb any such act. China's position on the issue of Diaoyu Dao is clear-cut and consistent. China's will to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity is firm and its resolve to uphold the outcomes of the World Anti-Fascist War will not be shaken by any force.

I. DiaoYu Dao Is China's Inherent Territory

Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands, which consist of Diaoyu Dao, Huangwei Yu, Chiwei Yu, Nanxiao Dao, Beixiao Dao, Nan Yu, Bei Yu, Fei Yu and other islands and reefs, are located to the northeast of China's Taiwan Island, in the waters between 123o20'-124o40'E (East Longitude) and 25o40'-26o00'N (North Latitude), and are affiliated to the Taiwan Island. The total landmass of these islands is approximately 5.69 square kilometers. Diaoyu Dao, situated in the western tip of the area, covers a landmass of about 3.91 square kilometers and is the largest island in the area. The highest peak on the island stands 362 meters above the sea level. Huangwei Yu, which is located about 27 kilometers to the northeast of Diaoyu Dao, is the second largest island in the area, with a total landmass of about 0.91 square kilometers and a highest elevation of 117 meters. Chiwei Yu, situated about 110 kilometers to the northeast of Diaoyu Dao, is the easternmost island in the area. It covers a landmass of approximately 0.065 square kilometers and stands 75 meters above the sea level at its peak.

1. Diaoyu Dao was first discovered, named and exploited by China

Ancient ancestors in China first discovered and named Diaoyu Dao through their production and fishery activities on the sea. In China's historical literatures, Diaoyu Dao is also called Diaoyu Yu or Diaoyu Tai. The earliest historical record of the names of Diaoyu Dao, Chiwei Yu and other places can be found in the book Voyage with a Tail Wind (Shun Feng Xiang Song) published in 1403 (the first year of the reign of Emperor Yongle of the Ming Dynasty). It shows that China had already discovered and named Diaoyu Dao by the 14th and 15th centuries.P In 1372 (the fifth year of the reign of Emperor Hongwu of the Ming Dynasty), the King of Ryukyu started paying tribute to the imperial court of the Ming Dynasty. In return, Emperor Hongwu (the first emperor of the Ming Dynasty) sent imperial envoys to Ryukyu. In the following five centuries until 1866 (the fifth year of the reign of Emperor Tongzhi of the Qing Dynasty), the imperial courts of the Ming and Qing Dynasties sent imperial envoys to Ryukyu 24 times to confer titles on the Ryukyu King, and Diaoyu Dao was exactly located on their route to Ryukyu. Ample volume of records about Diaoyu Dao could be found in the reports written by Chinese imperial envoys at the time. For example, the Records of the Imperial Title-conferring Envoys to Ryukyu (Shi Liu Qiu Lu) written in 1534 by Chen Kan, an imperial title-conferring envoy from the Ming court, clearly stated that "the ship has passed Diaoyu Dao, Huangmao Yu, Chi Yu... Then Gumi Mountain comes into sight, that is where the land of Ryukyu begins." The Shi Liu Qiu Lu of another imperial envoy of the Ming Dynasty, Guo Rulin, in 1562 also stated that "Chi Yu is the mountain that marks the boundary of Ryukyu". In 1719, Xu Baoguang, a deputy title-conferring envoy to Ryukyu in the Qing Dynasty, clearly recorded in his book Records of Messages from Chong-shan (Zhong Shan Chuan Xin Lu) that the voyage from Fujian to Ryukyu passed Huaping Yu, Pengjia Yu, Diaoyu Dao, Huangwei Yu, Chiwei Yu and reached Naba (Naha) port of Ryukyu via Gumi Mountain (the mountain guarding the southwest border of Ryukyu) and Machi Island.

In 1650, the Annals of Chong-shan (Zhong Shan Shi Jian), the first official historical record of the Ryukyu Kingdom drafted under the supervision of Ryukyu's prime minister Xiang Xiangxian (Kozoken), confirmed that Gumi Mountain (also called Gumi Mountain, known as Kume Island today) is part of Ryukyu's territory, while Chi Yu (known as Chiwei Yu today) and the areas to its west are not Ryukyu's territory. In 1708, Cheng Shunze (Tei Junsoku), a noted scholar and the Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon (Zi Jin Da Fu) of Ryukyu, recorded in his book A General Guide (Zhi Nan Guang Yi) that "Gumi Mountain is the mountain guarding the southwest border of Ryukyu".

These historical accounts clearly demonstrate that Diaoyu Dao and Chiwei Yu belong to China and Kume Island belongs to Ryukyu, and that the separating line lies in Hei Shui Gou (today's Okinawa Trough) between Chiwei Yu and Kume Island. In 1579, Xie Jie, a deputy imperial title-conferring envoy of the Ming Dynasty, recorded in his book, Addendum to Summarized Record of Ryukyu (Liu Qiu Lu Cuo Yao Bu Yi) that he entered Ryukyu from Cang Shui to Hei Shui, and returned to China from Hei Shui to Cang Shui. Xia Ziyang, another imperial envoy of the Ming court, wrote in 1606 that "when the water flows from Hei Shui back to Cang Shui, it enters the Chinese territory." Miscellaneous Records of a Mission to Ryukyu (Shi Liu Qiu Za Lu), a book written in 1683 by Wang Ji, an imperial envoy of the Qing Dynasty, stated that "Hei Shui Gou", situated outside Chi Yu, is the "boundary between China and foreign land". In 1756, Zhou Huang, a deputy imperial envoy of the Qing Dynasty, recorded in his book, the Annals of Ryukyu (Liu Qiu Guo Zhi Lue), that Ryukyu "is separated from the waters of Fujian by Hei Shui Gou to the west".

The waters surrounding Diaoyu Dao are traditionally Chinese fishing ground. Chinese fishermen have, for generations, engaged in fishery activities in these waters. In the past, Diaoyu Dao was used as a navigation marker by the Chinese people living on the southeast coast.

2. Diaoyu Dao had long been under China's jurisdiction

In the early years of the Ming Dynasty, China placed Diaoyu Dao under its coastal defense to guard against the invasion of Japanese pirates along its southeast coast. In 1561 (the 40th year of the reign of Emperor Jiajing of the Ming Dynasty), An Illustrated Compendium on Maritime Security (Chou Hai Tu Bian) compiled by Zheng Ruozeng under the auspices of Hu Zongxian, the supreme commander of the southeast coastal defense of the Ming court, included the Diaoyu Dao Islands on the "Map of Coastal Mountains and Sands" (Yan Hai Shan Sha Tu) and incorporated them into the jurisdiction of the coastal defense of the Ming court. The Complete Map of Unified Maritime Territory for Coastal Defense (Qian Kun Yi Tong Hai Fang Quan Tu), drawn up by Xu Bida and others in 1605 (the 33rd year of the reign of Emperor Wanli of the Ming Dynasty) and the Treatise on Military Preparations.Coastal Defense II.Map of Fujian's Coastal Mountains and Sands (Wu Bei Zhi.Hai Fang Er.Fu Jian Yan Hai Shan Sha Tu), drawn up by Mao Yuanyi in 1621 (the first year of the reign of Emperor Tianqi of the Ming Dynasty), also included the Diaoyu Dao Islands as part of China's maritime territory.

The Qing court not only incorporated the Diaoyu Dao Islands into the scope of China's coastal defense as the Ming court did, but also clearly placed the islands under the jurisdiction of the local government of Taiwan. Official documents of the Qing court, such as A Tour of Duty in the Taiwan Strait (Tai Hai Shi Cha Lu) and Annals of Taiwan Prefecture (Tai Wan Fu Zhi) all gave detailed accounts concerning China's administration over Diaoyu Dao. Volume 86 of Recompiled General Annals of Fujian (Chong Zuan Fu Jian Tong Zhi), a book compiled by Chen Shouqi and others in 1871 (the tenth year of the reign of Emperor Tongzhi of the Qing Dynasty), included Diaoyu Dao as a strategic location for coastal defense and placed the islands under the jurisdiction of Gamalan, Taiwan (known as Yilan County today).

3. Chinese and foreign maps show that Diaoyu Dao belongs to China

The Roadmap to Ryukyu (Liu Qiu Guo Hai Tu) in the Shi Liu Qiu Lu written by imperial title-conferring envoy Xiao Chongye in 1579 (the seventh year of the reign of Emperor Wanli of the Ming Dynasty), the Record of the Interpreters of August Ming (Huang Ming Xiang Xu Lu) written by Mao Ruizheng in 1629 (the second year of the reign of Emperor Chongzhen of the Ming Dynasty), the Great Universal Geographic Map (Kun Yu Quan Tu) created in 1767 (the 32nd year of the reign of Emperor Qianlong of the Qing Dynasty), and the Atlas of the Great Qing Dynasty (Huang Chao Zhong Wai Yi Tong Yu Tu) published in 1863 (the second year of the reign of Emperor Tongzhi of the Qing Dynasty) all marked Diaoyu Dao as China's territory.

The book Illustrated Outline of the Three Countries written by Hayashi Shihei in 1785 was the earliest Japanese literature to mention Diaoyu Dao. The Map of the Three Provinces and 36 Islands of Ryukyu in the book put Diaoyu Dao as being apart from the 36 islands of Ryukyu and colored it the same as the mainland of China, indicating that Diaoyu Dao was part of China's territory.

The Map of East China Sea Littoral States created by the French cartographer Pierre Lapie and others in 1809 colored Diaoyu Dao, Huangwei Yu, Chiwei Yu and the Taiwan Island as the same. Maps such as A New Map of China from the Latest Authorities published in Britain in 1811, Colton's China published in the United States in 1859, and A Map of China's East Coast: Hongkong to Gulf of Liao-Tung compiled by the British Navy in 1877 all marked Diaoyu Dao as part of China's territory.

II. Japan Grabbed DiaoYu Dao From China

Japan accelerated its invasion and external expansion after the Meiji Restoration. Japan seized Ryukyu in 1879 and changed its name to Okinawa Prefecture. Soon after that, Japan began to act covertly to invade and occupy Diaoyu Dao and secretly "included" Diaoyu Dao in its territory at the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Japan then forced China to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki and cede to Japan the island of Formosa (Taiwan), together with Diaoyu Dao and all other islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa.

1. Japan's covert moves to seize Diaoyu Dao

In 1884, a Japanese man claimed that he first landed on Diaoyu Dao and found the island to be uninhabited. The Japanese government then dispatched secret facts-finding missions to Diaoyu Dao and attempted to invade and occupy the island. The above-mentioned plots by Japan triggered China's alert. On September 6, 1885 (the 28th day of the 7th month in the 11th year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty), the Chinese newspaper Shen-pao (Shanghai News) reported: "Recently, Japanese flags have been seen on the islands northeast to Taiwan, revealing Japan's intention to occupy these islands." But the Japanese government did not dare to take any further action for fear of reaction from China.

After the secret facts-finding missions to Diaoyu Dao, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture sent a report in secrecy to the Minister of Internal Affairs Yamagata Aritomo on September 22, 1885, saying that these uninhabited islands were, in fact, the same Diaoyu Tai, Huangwei Yu and Chiwe Yu that were recorded in the Records of Messages from Chong-shan (Zhong Shan Chuan Xin Lu) and known well to imperial title-conferring envoys of the Qing court on their voyages to Ryukyu, and that he had doubts as to whether or not sovereignty markers should be set up and therefore asked for instruction. The Minister of Internal Affairs Yamagata Aritomo solicited opinion from the Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru on October 9. Inoue Kaoru replied in a letter to Yamagata Aritomo on October 21, "At present, any open moves such as placing sovereignty markers are bound to alert the Qing imperial court. Therefore, it is advisable not to go beyond field surveys and detailed reports on the shapes of the bays, land and other resources for future development. In the meantime, we will wait for a better time to engage in such activities as putting up sovereignty markers and embarking on development on the islands." Inoue Kaoru also made a special emphasis that "it is inappropriate to publicize the missions on official gazette or newspapers." As a result, the Japanese government did not approve of the request of Okinawa Prefecture to set up sovereignty markers.

The governor of Okinawa Prefecture submitted the matter for approval to the Minister of Internal Affairs once again on January 13, 1890, saying that Diaoyu Dao and other "above-mentioned uninhabited islands have remained under no specific jurisdiction", and that he "intends to place them under the jurisdiction of the Office of Yaeyama Islands." On November 2, 1893, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture applied once again for setting up sovereignty markers to incorporate the islands into Japan's territory. The Japanese government did not respond. On May 12, 1894, two months before the Sino-Japanese War, the secret facts-finding missions to Diaoyu Dao by Okinawa Prefecture came to a final conclusion, "Ever since the prefecture police surveyed the island in 1885 (the 18th year of the Meiji period), there have been no subsequent investigations. As a result, it is difficult to provide any specific reports on it... In addition, there exist no old records related to the said island or folklore and legends demonstrating that the island belongs to our country."

Japan's attempts to occupy Diaoyu Dao were clearly recorded in Japan Diplomatic Documents compiled by the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Relevant documents evidently show that the Japanese government intended to occupy Diaoyu Dao, but refrained from acting impetuously as it was fully aware of China's sovereignty over these islands.

Japan waged the Sino-Japanese War in July 1894. Towards the end of November 1894, Japanese forces seized the Chinese port of Lushun (then known as Port Arthur), virtually securing defeat of the Qing court. Against such backdrop, the Japanese Minister of Internal Affairs Yasushi Nomura wrote to Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu on December 27 that the "circumstances have now changed", and called for a decision by the cabinet on the issue of setting up sovereignty markers in Diaoyu Dao and incorporating the island into Japan's territory. Mutsu Munemitsu expressed his support for the proposal in his reply to Yasushi Nomura on January 11, 1895. The Japanese cabinet secretly passed a resolution on January 14 to "place" Diaoyu Dao under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture.

Japan's official documents show that from the time of the facts-finding missions to Diaoyu Dao in 1885 to the occupation of the islands in 1895, Japan had consistently acted in secrecy without making its moves public. This further proves that Japan's claim of sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao does not have legal effect under international law.

2. Diaoyu Dao was ceded to Japan together with the Taiwan Island

On April 17, 1895, the Qing court was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War and forced to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki and cede to Japan "the island of Formosa (Taiwan), together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa". The Diaoyu Dao Islands were ceded to Japan as "islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa". In 1900, Japan changed the name of Diaoyu Dao to "Senkaku Islands".

III. Backroom Deals Between The United States And Japan Concerning DiaoYu Dao Are Illegal And Invalid

Diaoyu Dao was returned to China after the Second World War. However, the United States arbitrarily included Diaoyu Dao under its trusteeship in the 1950s and "returned" the "power of administration" over Diaoyu Dao to Japan in the 1970s. The backroom deals between the United States and Japan concerning Diaoyu Dao are acts of grave violation of China's territorial sovereignty. They are illegal and invalid. They have not and cannot change the fact that Diaoyu Dao belongs to China.

1. Diaoyu Dao was returned to China after the Second World War

In December 1941, the Chinese government officially declared war against Japan together with the abrogation of all treaties between China and Japan. In December 1943, the Cairo Declaration stated in explicit terms that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed." In July 1945, the Potsdam Proclamation stated in Article 8: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." On September 2, 1945, the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Proclamation in explicit terms with the Japanese Instrument of Surrender and pledged to faithfully fulfill the obligations enshrined in the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation. On January 29, 1946, the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers Instruction (SCAPIN) No.677 clearly defined Japan's power of administration to "include the four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku) and the approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands and the Ryukyu Islands north of the 30th parallel of North Latitude". On October 25, 1945, the ceremony for accepting Japan's surrender in Taiwan Province of the China War Theater was held in Taipei, and the Chinese government officially recovered Taiwan. On September 29, 1972, the Japanese government committed with all seriousness in the China-Japan Joint Statement that "the Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China [Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China], and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation."

These facts show that in accordance with the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, Diaoyu Dao, as affiliated islands of Taiwan, should be returned, together with Taiwan, to China.

2. The United States illegally included Diaoyu Dao under its trusteeship

On September 8, 1951, Japan, the United States and a number of other countries signed the Treaty of Peace with Japan (commonly known as the Treaty of San Francisco) with China being excluded from it. The treaty placed the Nansei Islands south of the 29th parallel of North Latitude under United Nations' trusteeship, with the United States as the sole administering authority. It should be pointed out that the Nansei Islands placed under the administration of the United States in the Treaty of Peace with Japan did not include Diaoyu Dao.

The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) issued Civil Administration Ordinance No. 68 (Provisions of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands) on February 29, 1952 and Civil Administration Proclamation No. 27 (defining the "geographical boundary lines of the Ryukyu Islands") on December 25, 1953, arbitrarily expanding its jurisdiction to include China's Diaoyu Dao. However, there were no legal grounds whatsoever for the US act, to which China has firmly opposed.

3. The United States and Japan conducted backroom deals concerning the "power of administration" over Diaoyu Dao

On June 17, 1971, Japan and the United States signed the Agreement Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (Okinawa Reversion Agreement), which provided that any and all powers of administration over the Ryukyu Islands and Diaoyu Dao would be "returned" to Japan. The Chinese people, including overseas Chinese, all condemned such a backroom deal. On December 30, 1971, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a solemn statement, pointing out that "it is completely illegal for the government of the United States and Japan to include China's Diaoyu Dao Islands into the territories to be returned to Japan in the Okinawa Reversion Agreement and that it can by no means change the People's Republic of China's territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Dao Islands". The Taiwan authorities also expressed firm opposition to the backroom deal between the United States and Japan.

In response to the strong opposition of the Chinese government and people, the United States had to publicly clarify its position on the sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao. In October 1971, the US administration stated that "the United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims. The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants... The United States has made no claim to Diaoyu Dao and considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned." In November 1971, when presenting the Okinawa Reversion Agreement to the US Senate for ratification, the US Department of State stressed that the United States took a neutral position with regard to the competing Japanese and Chinese claims to the islands, despite the return of administrative rights over the islands to Japan.

IV. Japan's Claim Of Sovereignty Over DiaoYu Dao Is Totally Unfounded

On March 8, 1972, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in an attempt to explain the Japanese government's claims of sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao. First, Japan claims that Diaoyu Dao was "terra nullius" and not part of Pescadores, Formosa [Taiwan] or their affiliated islands which were ceded to Japan by the Qing government in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Second, Japan claims that Diaoyu Dao was not included in the territory which Japan renounced under Article 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco, but was placed under the administration of the United States as part of the Nansei Islands in accordance with Article 3 of the said treaty, and was included in the area for which the administrative rights were reverted to Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. Third, Japan claims that China didn't regard Diaoyu Dao as part of Taiwan and had never challenged the inclusion of the islands in the area over which the United States exercised administrative rights in accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty of San Francisco.

Such claims by Japan fly in the face of facts and are totally unfounded.

Diaoyu Dao belongs to China. It is by no means "terra nullius". China is the indisputable owner of Diaoyu Dao as it had exercised valid jurisdiction over the island for several hundred years long before the Japanese people "discovered" it. As stated above, voluminous Japanese official documents prove that Japan was fully aware that according to international law, Diaoyu Dao has long been part of China and was not "terra nullius". Japan's act to include Diaoyu Dao as "terra nullius" into its territory based on the "occupation" principle is in fact an illegal act of occupying Chinese territory and has no legal effect according to international law.

Diaoyu Dao has always been affiliated to China's Taiwan Island both in geographical terms and in accordance with China's historical jurisdiction practice. Through the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan forced the Qing court to cede to it "the island of Taiwan, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to it", including Diaoyu Dao. International legal documents such as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation provide that Japan must unconditionally return the territories it has stolen from China. These documents also clearly define Japan's territory, which by no means includes Diaoyu Dao. Japan's attempted occupation of Diaoyu Dao, in essence, constitutes a challenge to the post-war international order established by such legal documents as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation and seriously violates the obligations Japan should undertake according to international law.

Diaoyu Dao was not placed under the trusteeship established by the Treaty of San Francisco, which was signed between the United States and other countries with Japan and is partial in nature. The United States arbitrarily expanded the scope of trusteeship to include Diaoyu Dao, which is China's territory, and later "returned" the "power of administration" over Diaoyu Dao to Japan. This has no legal basis and is totally invalid according to international law. The government and people of China have always explicitly opposed such illegal acts of the United States and Japan.

V. China Has Taken Resolute Measures To Safeguard Its Sovereignty Over DiaoYu Dao

China has, over the past years, taken resolute measures to safeguard its sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao.

China has, through the diplomatic channel, strongly protested against and condemned the backroom deals between the United States and Japan over Diaoyu Dao. On August 15, 1951, before the San Francisco Conference, the Chinese government made a statement: "If the People's Republic of China is excluded from the preparation, formulation and signing of the peace treaty with Japan, it will, no matter what its content and outcome are, be regarded as illegal and therefore invalid by the central people's government." On September 18, 1951, the Chinese government issued another statement stressing that the Treaty of San Francisco is illegal and invalid and can under no circumstances be recognized. In 1971, responding to the ratifications of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement by the US Congress and Japanese Diet, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a stern statement which pointed out that the Diaoyu Dao Islands have been an indivisible part of the Chinese territory since ancient times.

In response to Japan's illegal violation of China's sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao, the Chinese government has taken active and forceful measures such as issuing diplomatic statements, making serious representations with Japan and submitting notes of protest to the United Nations, solemnly stating China's consistent proposition, principle and position, firmly upholding China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, and earnestly protecting the safety of life and property of Chinese citizens.

China has enacted domestic laws, which clearly provide that Diaoyu Dao belongs to China. In 1958, the Chinese government released a statement on the territorial sea, announcing that Taiwan and its adjacent islands belong to China. In light of Japan's repeated violations of China's sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao since the 1970s, China adopted the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1992, which unequivocally prescribes that "Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Dao" belong to China. The 2009 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Offshore Islands establishes the protection, development and management system of offshore islands and prescribes the determination and announcement of the names of offshore islands, on the basis of which China announced the standard names of Diaoyu Dao and some of its affiliated islands in March 2012. On September 10, 2012, the Chinese government issued a statement announcing the baselines of the territorial sea of Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands. On September 13, the Chinese government deposited the coordinates table and chart of the base points and baselines of the territorial sea of Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

China has maintained routine presence and exercised jurisdiction in the waters of Diaoyu Dao. China's marine surveillance vessels have been carrying out law enforcement patrol missions in the waters of Diaoyu Dao, and fishery administration law enforcement vessels have been conducting regular law enforcement patrols and fishery protection missions to uphold normal fishing order in the waters of Diaoyu Dao. China has also exercised administration over Diaoyu Dao and the adjacent waters by releasing weather forecasts and through oceanographic monitoring and forecasting.

Over the years, the issue of Diaoyu Dao has attracted attention from Hong Kong and Macao compatriots, Taiwan compatriots and overseas Chinese. Diaoyu Dao has been an inherent territory of China since ancient times. This is the common position of the entire Chinese nation. The Chinese nation has the strong resolve to uphold state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The compatriots across the Taiwan Straits stand firmly together on matters of principle to the nation and in the efforts to uphold national interests and dignity. The compatriots from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and the overseas Chinese have all carried out various forms of activities to safeguard China's territorial sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao, strongly expressing the just position of the Chinese nation, and displaying to the rest of the world that the peace-loving Chinese nation has the determination and the will to uphold China's state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Conclusion

Diaoyu Dao has been an inherent territory of China since ancient times, and China has indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao. As China and Japan were normalizing relations and concluding the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in the 1970s, the then leaders of the two countries, acting in the larger interest of China-Japan relations, reached important understanding and consensus on "leaving the issue of Diaoyu Dao to be resolved later." But in recent years, Japan has repeatedly taken unilateral measures concerning Diaoyu Dao and conducted in particular the so-called "nationalization" of Diaoyu Dao. This severely infringed upon China's sovereignty and ran counter to the understanding and consensus reached between the older generation of leaders of the two countries. It has not only seriously damaged China-Japan relations, but also rejected and challenged the outcomes of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War.

China strongly urges Japan to respect history and international law and immediately stop all actions that undermine China's territorial sovereignty. The Chinese government has the unshakable resolve and will to uphold the nation's territorial sovereignty. It has the confidence and ability to safeguard China's state sovereignty and territorial integrity.